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Abstract
This paper examines the recent shift toward an anti-tax shelter federal income tax
compliance norm at public corporations, as evidenced by practitioner and government
comments and survey results. The paper focuses on the organizational behavior of tax
decisionmakers within public corporations as they respond to Sarbanes-Oxley,
enforcement and publicity initiatives, and tax shelter regulation.
The paper identifies three elements that have contributed to the development of a
stronger tax compliance norm. First, Sarbanes-Oxley has resulted in the expansion and
increased transparency of public corporation tax decisionmaking groups. Organizational
behavior insights suggest that this may produce more considered decisions. Second, civil
and criminal enforcement and accompanying publicity have resulted in real concerns
about personal and firm liability among organization leaders. This causes organization
hierarchies to encourage and reward compliance. Third, the government has clearly
identified objectionable tax shelter transactions and plainly labeled them unacceptable
and even fraudulent. In the tax shelter area, this substantially reduces the ethical or legal
uncertainty that otherwise presents an obstacle to the development of compliance norms
in organizations.
The paper identifies elements of this story that do not fit neatly under the classic
economic analysis of tax avoidance or evasion, including the importance of enforcement
outside the tax context and the particular power of clear government rules. The paper
argues that this norm development story could provide a blueprint for regulatory attacks
on deviant transactions but contends that it offers different lessons for regulatory
challenges in greyer areas, pointing to a more cooperative approach. It also sketches the
challenges of a cost-benefit analysis of such culturally sensitive regulatory strategies.
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Introduction
Tax fraud. Tax shelters. Aggressive tax planning. Figuring out the line between
acceptable and unacceptable activity presents a challenge for every tax decisionmaker,
and overseeing these choices involves not just substantive tax regulation, but attention to
the decision-making process. This Article will review the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, tax and securities enforcement efforts, and tax shelter regulation on
corporate tax decisionmaking. It argues, using the example of promoted tax shelters, that
context and culture, in addition to substantive rules, determine the impact of tax
regulation on organizations such as large corporations.
Practitioner comments and survey evidence indicate the emergence of a new
compliance norm at public corporations:
•

Compliance (including compliance with tax accounting standards and SarbanesOxley internal control requirements) has replaced tax planning as the number-one
project of public corporation tax departments.1

•

Tax directors and tax advisors worry more about personal or firm liability2 or
adverse publicity3 resulting from tax or tax accounting noncompliance.

1

See Brad L. Brown & James Wolfrom, “SOX 404: Year Two” at 21 (Nov. 7, 2005) (powerpoint
presentation for San Jose State University/Tax Executives International Conference, on file with the author)
(citing KPMG survey results showing financial reporting, Sarbanes-Oxley and tax return compliance as the
top three priorities and effective tax rate management as the fourth); Tax Council Policy Institute Market
Research Study at 11 (February 2006) (hereinafter “TCPI 2006 Survey”) (survey results prepared for Tax
Council Policy Institute conference, on file with the author) (citing avoiding a financial statement error as
one of the two top priorities for 83% of Fortune 500 tax director respondents and achieving financial
statement benefit for 50% of respondents). The TCPI 2006 Survey solicited responses from the tax
directors of the Fortune 500 from December 2005 – January 2006 and received 123 responses. Id. at 4. The
questionnaire report states that it has a margin of error of plus or minus 9% at a 95% confidence level. Id.
at 5.
2
Employees worry, for example, that they may be scapegoated by employers seeking to avoid criminal
prosecution at the firm level. See Memorandum to Heads of Department Components; United States
Attorneys from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General (Jan. 20, 2003) (available at
www.usdoj.gov) (outlining “principles of federal prosecution of business organizations) [hereinafter
“Thompson Memo”]; see, e.g., Daniel Fisher & Peter Lattman, “Ratted Out,” Forbes, July 4, 2005, at 49
(reporting that the Justice Department’s policy of encouraging employer cooperation can result in the
fingering of employees and the refusal to cooperate in their defense efforts); Letter from Current and
Former KPMG Board Members and Washington National Tax Partners to Wall Street Journal, New York
Times et al. (August 10, 2005) (on file with the author) (criticizing KPMG’s decision to save the firm by
entering into a deferred prosecution agreement, failing to take responsibility for top-level firm decisions
with respect to the tax shelter business, and firing and refusing to help KPMG partners with legal fees or
otherwise in connection with defense of civil or criminal litigation) [hereinafter “KPMG Anonymous
Letter”].
3
See, e.g., “Ernst & Young Analyzes Tax Transparency Dynamics,” 2006 TNT 69-10 (Apr. 10, 2006)
(“Companies are now more concerned than they have ever been about the diminution of their ‘brand value’
arising from the disclosure of breakdowns in corporate governance processes, including those related to tax
transactions. In an Ernst & Young LLP survey of global tax directors, 70 percent said that ‘reputational
consequence,’ should a strategy become public, is a very important factor in their tax planning analysis.
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•

Marketing tax shelters to public corporations is no longer big business.4

Most of this Article focuses on a narrow compliance norm: public corporations’
current reluctance to participate in promoted tax shelter transactions. In Part I, this
Article describes the typical tax decisionmaking group at a public corporation and
identifies organizational behavior concepts that help explain the emergence of the
existing anti-tax shelter norm. Then, the Article sets forth three elements that have
contributed to the development of this norm.
First, as discussed in Part II, Sarbanes-Oxley expanded the tax decisionmaking
group and increased its transparency within the corporate organization. Second, as
described in Part III, this group is pulled toward a compliance norm by concerns about
liability at each of the firms to which the group’s members belong. These liability
concerns stem from enforcement and publicity efforts in both tax and nontax contexts and
draw reinforcement from Sarbanes-Oxley financial statement certification and audit
committee oversight requirements. Third, as outlined in Part IV, the government has
clearly labeled certain unacceptable transactions, making it straightforward for a
compliance-oriented tax decisionmaking group to exclude transactions described in the
tax shelter regulations, particularly listed transactions, from their planning.
The usual economic analysis would explain these compliance developments by
framing the tax decisionmaker’s choice as a comparison of (1) the cost of paying tax and
(2) the difference between the benefit of avoiding the tax and the cost of the imposition of
tax, interest, and penalties, risk-adjusted for the possibility that the government will
successfully challenge the tax avoidance strategy and perhaps adjusted for risk aversion
and reputational loss factors.5

This has translated into a more conservative approach to all tax planning, even when tax planning is related
to an entirely appropriate business purpose, as it must be.”).
4
See Robert Goulder, “Current, Former IRS Officials See New Attitude in Corporate Tax Planning,” 2005
TNT 206-5 (October 25, 2005) (reporting observation of IRS official Deborah Butler of “a more
conservative approach to strategic tax planning”); Allan Kenney, “Treasury, IRS Officials Discuss Shelter
Crackdowns, Circular 230 Concerns,” 2005 TNT 125-2 (June 29, 2005) (reporting government officials’
praise for progress in “stamping out abusive tax shelters” and their attribution of that progress to
“stemming shelter promotion”) (citing statements of IRS Commissioner Mark Everson, IRS Chief Counsel
Donald Korb, and acting Treasury deputy assistant secretary for tax policy Eric Solomon). Conversations
with practitioners confirm the observations of these government officials. See also Rachel Emma
Silverman, “The Search for a Safe Tax Shelter,” Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 2005 (“Big accounting and law firms
are being more cautious than in the past, shying away from marketing aggressive shelters, especially those
designed to generate losses.”). At least one recent academic article also shifts focus away from the problem
of tax shelters toward more diffuse tax compliance issues. See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, “Tax Advice Before
the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges,” 25 Va. Tax L. Rev. 583,
586 (2006) (arguing that compliance momentum must expand beyond mass-marketed tax shelters to more
tailored, but still abusive, tax planning).
5
See Joel Slemrod, “The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness,” 57 Nat’l Tax J. 877, 881-82 (2004)
(describing standard model).
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The economic analysis predicts that increased taxpayer penalties, whether
enforcement of existing penalties6 or the addition of larger7 or differently-designed8
penalties, will deter tax avoidance by directly increasing its cost. The economic approach
also suggests that disclosure will lead to more compliance if it produces more
enforcement, both generally and specifically with respect to a disclosing taxpayer.9
This Article’s tax compliance norm development story is consistent with the
rational taxpayer economic model. Increased enforcement efforts and publicity increased
the perceived likelihood of discovery and expected size of civil and criminal penalties for
participation in promoted tax shelters considered abusive by the IRS. Increased
government efforts to identify and force disclosure of tax shelters also raised the chance
of discovery of such transactions.
However, this Article also claims the importance of several elements that do not
fit neatly into the rational economic taxpayer model. Part II argues that because tax
decisionmaking at large corporations is a group exercise, group dynamics amplify
commonly held views – including compliance tendencies. Part III contends that
enforcement efforts wholly unrelated to tax have had a positive impact on tax compliance
because they produce general liability concerns within organizations, including the
corporate taxpayer itself and advising accounting firms, to which members of the tax
decisionmaking group belong. Part IV emphasizes the importance of the clarity of the
line drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behavior in the tax shelter area as a
factor that helps a decisionmaking group avoid ethical uncertainty and reach consensus.
Part V acknowledges that this observed new norm is narrow. Some anecdotal
evidence suggests more generally conservative corporate taxpayer behavior, but
corporations continue to use creative tax planning tools such as hybrid securities and
offshore tax structures. Nevertheless, Part V argues that the government can draw on
organizational behavior insights to encourage compliance outside the promoted tax
shelter area, although the appropriate approach may differ from the three elements
contributing to the development of the anti-promoted tax shelter norm. As examples of
such culturally-sensitive regulation, Part V points to several IRS initiatives for large
corporations.

6

See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, “Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions,
and a Reply to Professor Weisbach,” 55 Tax L. Rev. 325, 361 (2002) (noting that taxpayers believe that
penalties will not be imposed).
7
See, e.g., Department of the Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters: Discussion, Analysis and
Legislative Proposals 109 (July 1999) (hereinafter “1999 Treasury Report”) (calling for a 25% excise tax
on tax benefits earned from a tax shelter).
8
See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, “Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the SelfAdjusting Penalty,” 109 Colum. L. Rev. 569, 572-73 (2006) (proposing to calculate penalty as a function of
related deduction or income item in order to impose a higher penalty for items that are more difficult to
detect).
9
See Ronald A. Pearlman, “Demystifying Disclosure: First Steps,” 55 Tax. L. Rev. 289, 293-94 (2002)
(listing tax policy, audit and deterrence reasons for requiring disclosure).
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Part V also states that the observed new norm may be temporary. It considers
how the government could encourage more permanent, noncyclical tax compliance
norms. Finally, Part V offers a brief consideration of the cost-benefit issues raised by the
regulatory approaches described in the Article.
I. The Behavior of the Tax Group
A. The Tax Director’s Organization
At a typical public corporation, the tax director has responsibility for making or
recommending tax decisions.10 Such decisions relate to both planning (for example,
determining what offshore structure optimizes the corporation’s tax position) and
financial accounting (for example, calculating the “tax provision,” which is the figure that
describes the corporation’s exposure to tax audit risk on its financial statements). This
tax director might have a vice president or similar title and typically reports to the
corporation’s CFO.
Depending on the size of the corporation, the tax director’s staff ranges in size
from two or three to twenty or more. The tax department generally has responsibility for
a range of taxes in addition to federal income taxes, including state income, sales and use,
property, customs and excise, non-US income and non-US value added taxes. As a
result, there is often a premium on recruiting staff members with varying kinds of
expertise, if only to cover routine return-filing tasks.
With respect to the tax planning portion of the tax director’s job, he or she
typically engages outside accounting, law, or other consulting firms as tax planning
advisors. Such experts may serve as ongoing consultants, particularly with respect to
financial accounting matters. Or they may advise on a specific project in a complex and
market-sensitive area, such a corporate acquisition transaction, an offshore intellectual
property structure, or a transfer pricing plan.
The tax director also receives outside advice with respect to the financial
accounting portion of his or her job. For example, the tax director may consult the tax
experts at the corporation’s financial accounting firm to determine whether a particular
tax planning exercise will result in a tax benefit asset on the corporation’s balance sheet.
As another example, each quarter the tax director typically confirms the corporation’s
calculation of the tax provision estimating its tax audit exposure with the accounting firm.
Historically, the financial accounting firm has often also provided tax consulting
advice. Before Sarbanes-Oxley, particularly in the case of marketed tax shelters, such
consulting advice was cross-sold by accounting firms to their audit clients under
conditions involving significant conflicts of interest: the provision of both tax and audit
advice by the same firm to a client discouraged an independent and critical financial
10

[2004-2005 Tax Executives Institute survey data to provide backup for description of tax director
organization in this Part III.A.]
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accounting review of the client’s tax planning.11 As discussed in more detail below, after
Sarbanes-Oxley, tax directors often separate tax planning and financial accounting, hiring
independent law firms or other tax planners to provide the former and relying on their
audit firm for the latter.12
In addition, after Sarbanes-Oxley, the tax director has another advisor: the
Section 404 auditor. As discussed in Part II.B.2 below, this auditor, who is often from
the corporation’s financial accounting firm but who has a separate mandate under
Sarbanes-Oxley, vets the process by which the tax department reaches its decisions in
order to certify that the process meets applicable “internal controls” requirements. The
Section 404 audit also often involves some examination of the substantive correctness of
tax positions.13
This Article accordingly examines the development of norms within a typical
post-Sarbanes-Oxley public corporation tax decisionmaking group anchored by at least
four tax or accounting specialists: the tax director, the outside law firm or other tax
planner, the financial auditor, and the Section 404 auditor. Each of the four members of
the tax decisionmaking group also belong to other groups. Specifically, they hail from
three different firms: the tax director from the public corporation; the Section 404 auditor
and the financial auditor from the corporation’s accounting firm; and the tax planner from
a law firm, consulting firm, or different accounting firm.
B.

The Relevance of an Expanded and More Transparent Group

As described above, the typical four-member public corporation tax
decisionmaking group is larger than the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley group for two reasons. First,
the public corporation’s financial auditor is less likely to provide tax planning advice.
Second, the Section 404 auditor has been added to the group.
Some organizational behavior texts consider group size and structure as it relates
to appropriate work assignments. They suggest that groups with centralized structures
are better at reaching quick, correct, simple decisions; groups with decentralized
structures, where each member of the group talks to the other members, are thought to be
better at reaching the right decisions in complicated cases.14 A group with a centralized
“wheel” or “star” structure may have a key decisionmaker at the center and a number of
individuals feeding information to that decisionmaking person.15 A decentralized or “all
channel” group is diagrammed as a polygon of some kind; the number of people in the

11

See, e.g., Bernard Wolfman, “The Best Way to Protect Auditor Independence,” 89 Tax Notes 1779 (Dec.
25, 2000) (noting that conflict of interest can result not only from provision of tax consulting services to an
audit client, but also from selling a tax product to a non-audit client, since “another tax product huckster”
might peddle a similar product).
12
See infra Part II.B.1.
13
See infra Part II.B.2.
14
See, e.g., Laurie J. Mullins, Management and Organisational Behavior at 488 ff. (1999).
15
Id.
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group determine the number of sides and points of the polygon, and each person
communicates with each other person in the group.16
The basic insight of the comparison between a “star” group and an “all-channel”
group is that complex problems benefit from the contribution of a number of different
viewpoints. Anyone who has circulated an academic article for review or run a tricky
situation by a law practice colleague has acted on a similar instinct. In addition to
capturing new ideas from a variety of sources, the process of discussion may help the
participants better focus their mental energies on the problem being discussed – as
opposed to the many other puzzles their brains constantly face.17
It is also true that an all-channel group has the potential to increase information
flow if the members of the group themselves belong to different networks. A related
theory considers “structural holes” in organizations. In the corporate governance context,
the application of this social capital and economic sociology theory suggests that gaps
between social networks in a corporation create opportunities for individuals who bridge
the gaps to control information and thus, results.18 For example, a CEO who is the sole
bridge between the social network of an independent board and the social network of a
corporation can benefit greatly from controlling the information the board receives (such
as compensation information).19
At least some pre-Sarbanes-Oxley decisions to engage in promoted tax shelters
were apparently made by the tax shelter promoter and the corporation, without input from
other advisors.20 In contrast, after Sarbanes-Oxley, the tax decisionmaking group
contains at least four tax or accounting specialists who bridge three major networks, those
of the audit firm, the tax planning firm, and the corporate tax department. Each group
member’s ability to control information for his or her own purposes is accordingly more
limited. In addition, the increased internal transparency21 of tax decisions at public
corporations after Sarbanes-Oxley, attributable in large part to audit committee
oversight,22 further limits tax decisionmakers’ ability to control information.

16

Id.
Cf. Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, “Neuroeconomics and Rationality,” 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1235,
1248-50 (2005) (describing neurological research indicating that the brain must choose what problems to
address and how carefully to consider decisions).
18
See Lawrence E. Mitchell, “Corporate Misbehavior by Elite Decision-Makers Symposium: Perspectives
from Law and Social Psychology: Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies: The Missing
Link in Corporate Governance,” 70 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1313, 1323-26 (2005) (summarizing Ronald Burt’s
theory).
19
See id. at 1348-1350 (suggesting that independent boards tend to be correlated with strong CEOs).
20
See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 214, 216 (1993) (describing decision involving
Compaq’s treasurer, assistant treasurer and CFO one day after a one-hour initial meeting with promoters
from Twenty-First Securities Corporation to enter into a foreign tax credit generation transaction), rev’d,
277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
21
Although “transparency” frequently means visibility of corporate decisions to outside groups such as
regulators or shareholders, this Article generally uses it to mean internal transparency, or visibility of
decisions made by small groups within a large organization to the rest of the organization.
22
See infra Part II.C.
17
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C. Group Norm Development
Even if group members effectively share information to reach more informed,
better decisions, “better” may not mean “more compliant” decisions, depending on how
the group defines “better.” Organizational behavior research has examined the
phenomenon of group norms, or the “informal rules that groups adopt to regulate . . .
group members’ behavior.”23 Positive and production-encouraging group norms may
include rules of etiquette (be prompt; don’t interrupt) and performance standards (do the
work assigned on deadline; be ready to back up conclusions with good data). They are
essential to the successful performance of a group. Conversely, detrimental group norms
may develop that hinder or block a group’s effectiveness.24
Group norms also encompass legal and ethical matters such as compliance with
the law. A compliance norm may take the form of narrow legal norm or a broader social
norm.25 These are distinguishable,26 though legal rule changes can prompt changes in
both.27 A narrow legal norm might produce a monitoring and internal control system
designed to effect purely rational, economic calculations regarding the cost of
compliance, likelihood of detection, and level of penalties.28 A social norm constitutes a
broader agreement that compliance is one of the social or even moral values of the
organization.29
Organizational behavior literature suggests that group norms develop within a
business organization as a result of negotiation between the members of the group, which

23

Daniel C. Feldman, “The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms,” in Management &
Organizational Behavior Classics 217, 217 (Michael T. Matteson & John M. Ivancevich, eds., 7th ed. 1999).
24
See, e.g., id. at 218 (distinguishing between group norms that facilitate productive behavior and those
that discourage it); Hackman & Oldham, [ ], in Classic Readings in Organizational Behavior 251, 257-58
(J. Steven Ott, ed., 2d ed. 1996) (recommending encouraging groups to develop specific performanceenhancing norms).
25
Cf. Barry D. Baysinger, “Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations,” 71 B.U.L.
Rev. 341, 349-50 (1991) (stating that management influences organizational norm development both
through direct “indoctrination,” or “strategic controls,” and through the selection of output measurement
standards for judging work, or “financial controls”);
26
See Eric Talley, “Disclosure Norms,” 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1955, 1960-61 (2001) (distinguishing between
legal compliance and extralegal norms, and arguing that the two are complementary).
27
See, e.g., Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms 33 (2000) (noting that legal changes can amend both
people’s behavior and their beliefs); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “The Limits of Social Norms,” 74 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 1537, 1544 (2000) (noting that law can produce social norm changes).
28
See, e.g., Timothy F. Malloy, “Regulation, Compliance and the Firm,” 76 Temp. L. Rev. 451, 472-73
(2003) (“[E]vidence of compliance-oriented firm policies and structures is equally consistent with the
deterrence model. Even a strictly rational firm would comply with some regulations, and thus would need
mechanisms to identify the ‘right’ rules with which to comply and to make sure that those obligations are
met.”).
29
See Robert Cooter, “Expressive Law and Economics,” 27 J. Leg. Stud. 585, 607 (1998) (“Law provides
an instrument for changing social norms by expressing commitments.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, “Corporate
Law and Social Norms,” 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253, 1262-63 (1999) (describing social norms rooted in
“belief systems”); Cass R. Sunstein, “Social Norms and Social Rules,” 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 914 (1996)
(attributing “social attitudes of approval and disapproval” to social norms).
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is heavily influenced by the views of leaders of the organization.30 Group norms may
differ from individual norms, and in particular may amplify them.31 Professor Cass
Sunstein has described group members’ tendency to defer to information offered by
others instead of disclosing their own information, particularly when differing
information is offered by a peer or supervisor and adverse reputational sanctions might
result from offering different information.32 Under this view, groups tend to amplify
information or results offered early in a discussion or by a senior member of the group –
whether the information or results are good or bad – and arrive at an more extreme
consensus relative to the individual view initially offered.33 Professor Donald
Langevoort offers the example of large corporations’ tendency to develop optimism
biases that lead to overcommitment and overbidding for assets.34
The same factors cited as reasons for the development of aggressive or risk-taking
firm norms can also support the development of compliance norms. The dynamic
Sunstein and Langevoort identify surely exists in public corporation tax decisionmaking
groups. But if each member of the group is inclined toward compliance as a result of
incentives at work at each member’s firm, increased compliance is the amplified
consensus. In other words, the group dynamic can work in the regulator’s favor.
Numerous authors have documented the phenomenon of the blurring of individual
norms within an organization. Some note that this de-emphasis of individual norms goes
along with the decrease in personal responsibility for a decision made by a group.35 In
addition, corporations are hierarchies, and disagreement with one’s superior on ethical (or
other) matters can cause adverse results ranging from an exclusion from social office
conversation to the loss of a job.36 Finally, commentators have observed that managers
30

See, e.g., James G. March & Herbert A. Simon, Organizations 99-100 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that
individual members of work groups can exert pressure on norm development and that disproportionate
weight may be accorded to norms to which more group members subscribe and norms held by senior group
members); Feldman, supra note 23, at 223 (stating that statements of superiors or other group members
affect the development of group norms); Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, “What Are the
Ways of Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility?: If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a
Corporate Morality,” 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1645, 1663 (2002) (contending that “individuals are psychologically
constrained by their corporate roles”).
31
See Donald C. Langevoort, “Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead
Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms),” 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 131 (1997) (noting that
corporations themselves “develop belief systems – shared ways of interpreting themselves, their
environments, their pasts, and their prospects”) (citing March & Simon, supra note 30, at 160).
32
See Cass R. Sunstein, “Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets,” 80
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 966 (2005) (identifying “informational influences” and “social pressures”).
33
See id. at 1012-13 (noting “polarization” process and “cascades”).
34
See id. at 139-40 (stating that business organizations often amplify optimism bias).
35
See, e.g., Don Welch, Conflicting Agendas: Personal Morality in Institutional Settings 61 (1994)
(commenting that the decrease in personal responsibility decreases the tension between individual morality
and group norms); see also Langevoort, supra note 31, at 138 (noting the particular strength of group
cohesion when group members share responsibility for a decision).
36
See Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes 45 (1988) (“For most managers, however, future chances in an
organization, after the crucial break points in a career are reached, are seen to depend not on competence
nor on performance as such. Instead, managers see success depending principally on meeting social criteria
established by the authority and political alignments – that is, by the fealty and alliance structure – and by
the ethos and style of the organization.”); John M. Darley, “The Dynamics of Authority Influence in
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often face uncertain dilemmas, where the ethical path is not clearly distinguishable from
the ethical path.37
D. The Relevance of Liability and Enforcement
The first two factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph -- decreased personal
responsibility and hierarchy -- make individual ethics in corporations contingent on the
ethics of the corporation, often as expressed through the views of one’s superiors. In
particular, with respect to the four tax or accounting specialists considered in this Article,
each member – the tax director, tax planner, financial auditor and Section 404 auditor –
belongs to a firm which provides top-down guidance on the appropriate priority to be
given to ethical or “compliance” considerations. This top-down guidance will largely
determine whether the group defines a “better” decision as a more compliant decision.
The factors of decreased personal responsibility and hierarchy explain the
importance of recent tax and securities enforcement efforts and practice standard
revisions. Part III further discusses these developments. To the extent that they generate
real anxiety about personal and firm liability among leaders of corporations, law firms,
other tax planning firms and accounting firms, the focus at the top on avoiding liability
should prompt subsidiary decisionmaking groups like the tax group to prioritize
compliance.38
This Article in fact observes such an emphasis on compliance, particularly with
respect to avoiding promoted tax shelters.39 Such a post-Sarbanes-Oxley compliance
result contrasts sharply with other studies of harmful corporate group dynamics.
Professor Robert Jackall describes norm development at corporations as an exercise in
trading more ethical individual norms for less ethical corporate norms. Jackall reports,
for example, a whistleblower who lost his job after reporting financial accounting fraud,40
an engineer who faced suspension after documenting procedural shortcuts in the cleanup

Organizations and the Unintended Action Consequences,” 37, 38, in Social Influences on Ethical Behavior
in Organizations (John M. Darley, David M. Messick & Tom R. Tyler, eds., 2001) (noting that authority
hierarchies help to influence individuals to commit acts they otherwise would not).
37
See, e.g., Baysinger, supra note 25, at 354 (noting the uncertainty of the boundary between legal and
illegal behavior, especially for less senior employees); Kimberly D. Krawiec, “Cosmetic Compliance and
the Failure of Negotiated Governance,” 81 Wash. U.L.Q. 487, 542-43 (2003) (arguing that inevitable gaps
in compliance rules leave room for self-interested groups including regulated corporations and their legal
advisers to push their own agendas).
38
Some note, however, that the process by which organizations communicate a top-down desire for
increased ethics or compliance is complex and imperfect, in part because of the inevitable simultaneous
focus on measurable output metrics. See, e.g., Baysinger, supra note 25, at 362-363 (citing NASA’s
experience with the 1986 Challenger disaster as an example of the difficulty of institutionalizing safety
norms); Malloy, supra note 28, at 491 (noting that information flow problems interfere with compliance
efforts).
39
See supra TAN 1-4.
40
See Jackall, supra note 36, at 105-11.
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of the Three Mile Island nuclear site,41 and corporate efforts to conceal respiratory illness
caused by cotton dust42 and ozone erosion caused by formaldehyde.43
In a similar vein, Professor Donald Langevoort has written extensively about the
“groupthink” phenomenon and other cognitive biases within corporations, in an effort to
explain securities fraud and other harmful activities.44 He argues that corporations suffer
from “optimism bias” and points out that groups give individuals a strong disincentive to
“introduce stressful dissonant information into a group setting once the group has
implicitly agreed to think otherwise.”45 The resulting conformity and dislike for negative
information encourages groups to make riskier, less conservative decisions than
individuals would make.46
Case studies of other business responses to regulation note the tension between
profit-oriented business norms, which are related to the harmful tendencies identified by
Jackall and Langevoort, and regulation-responsive compliance norms. For example,
Professors Ayres and Braithwaite conclude after examination of a series of case studies
that business managers can be influenced both by legal compliance norms and profitseeking norms.47 They state that in light of these conflicting incentives, both forgiveness
(for well-meaning firms) and ferocity (for rationally calculating firms) are appropriate
regulatory tools.48
The recently developed tax shelter compliance norm in public corporations,
however, finds support not only in individual managers’ underlying commitment to lawabiding behavior, but also in the consensus and conformity tendencies identified by
Jackall and Langevoort as typical factors in the creation of harmful group norms. In
particular, all four tax or accounting specialists – tax director, tax planner, Section 404
auditor and financial auditor – have reason to advocate compliance as a result of
individual concern about personal liability for aggressive planning. More critically, the
interaction of these individuals, each with an independent reason to fear liability, works
to overcome the tendency to discount the risk of enforcement (optimism bias) and
41

See Jackall, supra note 36, at 112-18.
See Jackall, supra note 36, at 157-5
43
See Jackall, supra note 36, at 177-78.
44
See Donald C. Langevoort, “The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and
Organizational Behavior,” 63 Brooklyn L. Rev. 629, 639-642 (1997) (citing cognitive simplification,
optimism and commitment as reasons why corporations overlook bad news and underestimate risk); see
Langevoort, supra note 31, at 138-39 (noting that groups’ desire to preserve cohesiveness can explain
institutional decisionmaking that leaves out important information) (citing Irving Janis, Victims of
Groupthink 8 (1972)).
45
See Donald C. Langevoort, “Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers,” 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
1569, 1578 (2000) (placing groups’ tendency to think positively in the context of a discussion about the
importance of myth in organizations).
46
See also Baysinger, supra note 25, at 353-54 (citing optimism bias as a reason why corporations may
commit crime).
47
See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 21-29
(1992) (noting a variety of motivations); see also Malloy, supra note 28, at 474-75 (noting evidence of
compliance norm development within business firms in other regulatory response case studies).
48
See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 47, at 27.
42
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contributes to the development of a compliance consensus and an anti-tax shelter group
norm.
E. The Relevance of a Clear Government Message
The third factor noted at the end of Part I.C as a contributing factor to the
phenomenon of individual norm blurring within an organization is the uncertainty of the
legal or ethical path. In a group decisionmaking context, such uncertainty permits other
goals – such as profit or self-interest – to push the ethical interpretation to its aggressive
limit.49 In the tax area, ongoing tax shelter controversies amply illustrate the difficulty of
determining whether a certain tax product is illegal.50
Moreover, in the area of corporate tax compliance, the clarity of the line between
acceptable and unacceptable activities is of particular importance. Despite some
evidence of conviction that individuals believe that paying taxes is a moral obligation,51
such an obligation can quickly become obscured, particularly in the corporate context, by
the complexity of the rules that determine the amount of tax due and uncertainty about
how the government will interpret and enforce them.52
Clear rules, as opposed to broad standards, have potential disadvantages, such as a
tradeoff between extreme complexity and failure to capture similar transactions.53 But in
the promoted tax shelter context clear rules appear to have achieved good results. The
unequivocal government disapproval of promoted tax shelters limits the impact of other
decision factors and provides a clear course of action that the members of the tax
decisionmaking group can agree on: don’t engage in promoted tax shelter transactions,
especially those that are listed as such.54

49

See supra note 37.
See infra Part IV.B.1 (describing tax shelter litigation).
51
See Slemrod, supra note 5, at 883 (noting significant “experimental and empirical evidence” that of
noneconomic taxpayer motives such as civic duty and trust in the fairness of the tax system); Robert W.
McGee, “The Ethics of Tax Evasion: A Survey of International Business Academics,” 25-28 (Feb. 12,
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (available at www.ssrn.com/ssrn-id803964)
(reporting survey results indicating that business professors believed tax evasion was unethical even where
government engaged in objectionable or even reprehensible acts); Pew Research Center, “A Barometer of
Modern Morals: Sex, Drugs and the 1040” 1 (Mar. 28, 2006) (reporting that 79% of survey respondents
believed that “not reporting all income on your taxes” was morally wrong).
52
See Slemrod, supra note 5, at 883 (noting that corporations frame the tax compliance question as a matter
of tax avoidance, or “creative compliance,” not tax evasion); id. at 884 (“To be sure, creative compliance is
facilitated because the tax law is exceedingly complex and open to alternative interpretations, and this
undoubtedly facilitates ethical rationalizations of positions taken.”).
53
See infra TAN 275-276.
54
See infra Part IV.B.3.
50
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II. How Sarbanes-Oxley Produced an Expanded and More Transparent Tax
Decisionmaking Group
A. Sarbanes-Oxley Overview.
The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 55 emerged from a highly charged political
atmosphere where decisionmakers were motivated to take action by well-publicized
scandals and a bear stock market.56 Some commentators have pointed out that the
enactors of Sarbanes-Oxley did not pay much attention to academic empirical evidence
and theoretical research relating to the likely success of various regulatory approaches.57
Others have criticized its failure to impose strict liability penalties on, or otherwise raise
the stakes for, the professionals auditing and advising corporations.58 But the impact of
Sarbanes-Oxley on the composition and internal transparency of public corporation tax
decisionmaking groups demonstrates the potential benefits of at least some provisions
enacted as part of that legislation.
Sarbanes-Oxley includes a new oversight board for the accounting profession;
various disclosure, audit and governance rules intended to encourage corporate
responsibility, specific rules to promote director and auditor independence; and
provisions imposing or increasing criminal penalties for actions including document

55

Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28
and 29 U.S.C.).
56
See Robert W. Hamilton, “The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style,” 40 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 45-48
(2003) (explaining that Republicans hastily dropped their opposition to the already-pending Democratic bill
in the face of an electorate unhappy about falling stock prices and apparent corporate governance failures);
Roberta Romano, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,” 114 Yale
L.J. 1521, 1543-44 (2005) (noting lack of attention to relevant research, pressure on Congress to act on
corporate fraud in an election year, and weakness of accounting and business lobbies in light of
contemporaneous scandals such as Enron).
57
See, e.g., Romano, supra note 56, at 1533-37 (contending that 19 of 25 available empirical studies found
no link between audit quality and prohibitions on auditor provision of non-audit services); id. at 1540-43
(stating that two available empirical studies of the value of officer certification of financial statements give
ambiguous results). See also Larry E. Ribstein, “Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,” 28 Iowa J. Corp. L. 1, 25, 35-45 (2002) (discussing
perceived costs of increased regulation).
58
See John C. Coffee, Jr., “Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms,” 84 B.U.L. Rev. 301, 349-353 (2004) (proposing better alignment of gatekeeper and shareholder
incentives through a regulatory strict liability); Patricia A. McCoy, “Realigning Auditors’ Incentives,” 35
Conn. L. Rev. 989, 1008-1012 (2003) (reviewing the alternate approaches of mandatory audit firm rotation,
statutory auditors and financial statement insurance); Frank Partnoy, “Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A
Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime,” 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 491, 540 (2001) (recommending
contractual strict liability based on portion of issuer damages). See also Lawrence A. Cunningham,
“Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability,” 52 UCLA L.
Rev. 413, 427-29 (2004) (evaluating financial statement insurance alternative). Accounting firms often
include liability caps and arbitration provisions in their engagement agreements. See Michael Rapoport,
“Auditing ‘Liability Caps’ Face Fire,” Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 2005, at C3 (reporting that some investors
object to the caps).
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destruction and fraud.59 With few exceptions60 Sarbanes-Oxley does not attempt to
distinguish substantively between appropriate and inappropriate transactions. For
example, the new oversight board, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, or
PCAOB,61 does not have responsibility for developing substantive rules under generally
accepted accounting principles, or GAAP. The Financial Accounting Standards Board,
or FASB, continues to make GAAP rules after Sarbanes-Oxley.62
B. Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions That Expand the Tax Decisionmaking Group
Two Sarbanes-Oxley provisions have produced an expansion in the tax
decisionmaking group: limitations on non-audit services and internal control
requirements.63
1. Non-Audit Services Limitations.
Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits an audit firm’s provision of tax services to its client
without prior approval from the client’s independent audit committee.64 Further, more
restrictive rules promulgated by the PCAOB flatly prohibit accounting firms from
providing (and cross-selling) certain kinds of tax services to their audit clients.65
Specifically, these PCAOB rules forbid the provision of advice related to the
implementation of any transaction listed as a shelter by the IRS,66 defined as a

59

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just
Might Work),” 35 Conn. L. Rev. 915, 941-42 (summarizing Sarbanes-Oxley threads); Hamilton, supra note
56, at 56-67 (cataloguing Sarbanes-Oxley provisions).
60
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(k) (codifying Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (prohibiting issuers from
extending certain personal loans to executives).
61
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7217, 7219 (codifying PCAOB provisions from Title I of Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
62
See 15 U.S.C. § 7218 (codifying Section 108 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which permits a private group to
continue to set accounting standards). FASB rule projects show the effects of recent events, however. See,
e.g., infra Part IV.C (regarding accounting for uncertain tax positions under proposed amendments to FAS
109).
63
See David E. Hardesty, “Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance in the Corporate Tax Department,” 2004 STT 2293 (Nov. 29, 2004) (analyzing non-audit services rules and Section 404).
64
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1 (h) and (i) (codifying a portion of Section 201(a) and Section 202 of SarbanesOxley Act). Prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, audit firms had divested many consulting units. See
Cunningham, supra note 59, at 953-954 (commenting on EY’s sale to Cap Gemini,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ sale to IBM, KPMG’s IPO/spin-off and Deloitte’s planned split-off). These
spin-offs, however, generally did not involve the separation of tax consulting services from audit
operations; instead, they focused on other consulting areas such as information technology.
65
See PCAOB, “Board Adopts Standard on Remediation of Material Weaknesses, Rules on Auditor
Independence and Tax Services,” July 26, 2005 (finalizing Rules 3521-3524). See also Emily Davis, “New
PCAOB Rules Target Tax Shelters,” 2005 TNT 145-5, July 29, 2005.
66
See PCAOB Rule 3522 (treating an auditor as not independent if it markets, plans or opines with respect
to any listed transaction as defined in Treasury regulations).
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confidential transaction by the IRS,67 involving the provision of certain aggressive tax
advice,68 or provided under a contingent fee arrangement.69
There is evidence that the restrictions on non-audit services have had real effects
in the market. In particular, even before the PCAOB finalized the rule described above,
one study of public filings suggested that the public corporations had significantly shifted
their consumption of tax services to advisors other than their auditors.70 One 2005
survey indicated that 41% of public corporations now prohibit their audit firms from
providing them with any tax services.71 Another survey indicates that audit firms are
often prohibited from providing any tax work to their audit clients and, even if they do
provide some tax work, are typically not the largest tax services provider.72
Corporations have, then, typically responded to the non-audit services rules by
adding a tax planning advisor from a different firm to the typical public corporation tax
decisionmaking group. Moreover, this shift may be more pronounced with respect to
more involved tax planning decisions. The cited data sources do not carefully distinguish
between routine tax services such as uncontroversial tax return preparation and more
involved tax planning, such as offshore tax structuring, transfer pricing, state tax
planning, or tax structuring in connection with a business transaction such as an
acquisition, joint venture or financing. But a more pronounced shift for advice in the
latter, more uncertain or riskier planning categories would be consistent with the PCAOB
rules, which focus on tax planning as opposed to return preparation.
2. Section 404.
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 requires public corporations to establish, document
and have audited “internal controls” ensuring accurate financial reporting.73
Commentators have sharply criticized the higher-than-expected costs of the internal
67

See PCAOB Rule 3522(a) (treating an auditor as not independent if it markets, plans or opines with
respect to any confidential transaction as defined in Treasury regulation § 1.6011-4(b)(3)).
68
See PCAOB Rule 3522(b) (treating an auditor as not independent if it markets, plans or opines with
respect to any transaction recommended by the firm that has a significant purpose of tax avoidance and if
the transaction is not more likely than permissible under relevant tax law).
69
See PCAOB Rule 3521 (treating an auditor as not independent if it has any contingent fee arrangement,
including one relating to tax advice).
70
See Edward L. Maydew & Douglas A. Shackelford, “The Changing Role of Auditors in Corporate Tax
Planning,” NBER Working Paper 11504, at 19-20 (June 2005) (finding that the ratio of audit fees to tax
fees, provided by the same firm, had increased from about 1:1 in 2001 to about 4:1 in 2004). Although an
increase in audit fees as a result of internal control and other compliance also influences this data, the
authors record the same trend for 2003, before companies began to incur Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs.
See id. The authors also present evidence that tax fees remain strong, although they tend to be earned from
clients other than audit clients. See id. at 21-24.
71
See KPMG LLP, “2005 Tax Department Survey: Executive Summary” 4 (2005) (on file with the author)
(reporting results of telephone survey of tax directors at 98 “major US corporations” in June and July
2005).
72
See TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1 at 19 (reporting that of 56% of responding tax directors used their
external audit firm for some tax work but not as the primary tax services provider, while 27% did not use
their external auditor for any tax work).
73
15 U.S.C. § 7262 (codifying Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404).

16

control rule74 and its confusing and overinclusive drafting.75 However, it appears to
provide some synergies with respect to the regulation of tax planning.
The SEC rules implementing Section 404 call for a “control framework that is
established by a body or group that has followed due-process requirements, including the
broad distribution of the framework for public comment.”76 In practice, companies rely
on the “COSO” internal control framework, compiled by a consortium of accounting
practice groups.77 The COSO standard is process oriented and elaborate. It features a
three-part process including controls (e.g. reviews and reconciliations), information
capture and communication and monitoring.78
74

The SEC estimated the costs of internal control compliance at $91,000 per company or $1.24 billion total
annually. See Securities and Exchange Comm’n, “Management’s Report on Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports,” 68 Fed. Reg.
36636, 36657 (June 18, 2003). But surveys demonstrate that the actual cost is significantly higher, even for
years subsequent to the initial year of compliance. See, e.g., Financial Executives International SarbanesOxley Survey Executive Summary 2 (Mar. 2006) (available at
http://www.fei.org/membersonly/FEI_404_Survey_4_2006.pdf ) (reporting internal and external costs at
larger accelerated filer companies at $3.8 million each for 2005); David Reilly, “Internal Control Help
Becomes Less Costly,” Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 2006, at C3 (reporting average internal and external cost for all
companies as $860,000 according to a survey by the Big Four accounting firms).
The high cost of internal control compliance has apparently led to going-private transactions. See
Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric Talley, “Going Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis,” USC Center in Law, Economics and Organization Research Paper
No. C06-5 and USC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-10, available at www.ssrn.com, at 56-57
(reporting empirical finding that the rate of acquisition of small public companies increased in the year
after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley). It may also have have discouraged non-U.S. corporations from
listing shares on U.S. exchanges. See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera & Andrei Postelnicu, “A Not so Foreign
Exchange: China Shuns the West as a Location for its Big Corporate Share Offers,” Financial Times, Nov.
18, 2005, at 13 (reporting that Chinese companies avoid listing on New York-based stock exchanges in part
to avoid the burdens of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance).
In partial response to these concerns, the SEC extended effective date of the Section 404 internal
control provisions for corporations whose market capitalization is less than $75 million, SEC,
“Management’s Report on Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in
Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Companies That Are Not Accelerated Filers, Rel. No,. 33-8618 (Sept.
22, 2005). An SEC advisory committee has recommended tailoring Sarbanes-Oxley to small businesses,
including exempting smaller companies from internal controls requirements. See generally Final Report of
the Advisory Committee on Small Public Companies to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 4857 (Apr. 23, 2006) (SEC Release 33-8666) [hereinafter “SEC Small Company Advisory Committee
Report”] (providing recommendations for “scaled” application of Rule 404 to smaller corporations,
including reduction or elimination of external audit requirements). The SEC is considering taking such
actions. See, e.g., Rebecca Buckman & Kara Scannell, “Do U.S. Regulations Drive Away Start-Ups?,”
Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 2006, at C5 (reporting SEC officials’ apparent willingness to consider tailoring internal
control requirements).
75
See Joseph A. Grundfest, Fixing 404 5 (Nov. 3, 2005) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author)
(noting that the internal control statute requires the reporting of control failures that “raise a more than
remote likelihood of a more than inconsequential misstatement”).
76
17 CFR 240.13a-15(c) (Exchange Act Rule 15d); 17 CFR 240.15d-15(c) (Exchange Act Rule 15d)
(containing same language).
77
See SEC Small Company Advisory Committee Report , supra note 74, at 26-27 (identifying and briefly
describing COSO standard).
78
See COSO, “Internal Control – Integrated Framework Executive Summary” (2005) (providing an
overview of COSO internal control approach).
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Section 404 auditors search for the tax department’s ability to catch, on a
quarterly79 or more current basis, law changes; correctly record notoriously elusive
intercompany transaction data; and document their decisions about reporting transactions
with memos or opinions from relevant advisors.80 Section 404 auditors describe a testing
process for tax matters that involves zeroing in on the “key review person” (the besieged
tax director), asking the person how he or she makes decisions, and then inspecting
records to ensure that the outlined approach (for example, the reconciliation of book and
tax numbers, memos that relate to particular transactions, the documentation of
intercompany transactions such as transfer pricing) is in fact followed.81 In a 2004
survey, a large majority of responding tax directors reported that “some additional effort”
or a “major effort” would be required for tax department implementation of Section
404.82
A Section 404 review may result in the identification of internal red flag
“significant deficiencies”83 and/or publicly reported reported “material weaknesses”84
related to tax. One source reports that over 200 material weaknesses and 31% of adverse
internal control opinions were tax-related in 2005.85 According to the chairman of the
SEC, tax issues are the second most frequent cause of material weaknesses (after revenue
recognition).86 Another source reports that up to a third of tax directors whose companies
reported a tax-related material weakness left their jobs.87 Whether or not specific issues
are identified as problems, the fact that a nonprivileged conversation must occur about

79

The focus on quarterly reporting finds reinforcement in the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement that CEOs and
CFOs certify quarterly and annual financial reports. See infra Part II.C.
80
See Hardesty, supra note 63, TAN 7-21 (outlining Section 404 internal evaluation and external audit
requirements)
81
James Wolfrom, Ernst & Young, LLP, Presentation at the SJSU/TEI High Technology Tax Institute
(Nov. 7, 2005) (explaining the “testing script”).
82
Tax Council Policy Institute Market Research Study at 7 (February 2004) (hereafter “TCPI 2004
Survey”) (reporting that 63% of respondents reported that “some additional effort” would be required and
26% reported that “a major effort” would be necessary). The TCPI 2004 Survey solicited responses from
the tax directors of the Fortune 500 from December 2003 – January 2004 and received 125 responses. Id.
at 3. The questionnaire report states that it has a margin of error of plus or minus 9% at a 95% confidence
level. Id. at 5.
83
Significant deficiencies are known as “minor blows” in the inevitable accounting firm parlance. Brad L.
Brown, KPMG LLP, Presentation at the SJSU/TEI High Technology Tax Institute (Nov. 7, 2005).
84
Or “major blows.” Id.
85
See Allen Shoulders, “Practical Approaches to Improving Tax Control Effectiveness,” 2006 TNT 80-37
(Apr. 18, 2006) (reporting results from Ernst & Young examination of public records and from an Audit
Analytics study).
86
See Christopher Cox & Matthew McKenna, “The Corporate Tax Practice: New Challenges,” TAXES
49, 49-50 (June 2006). Practitioners report that the most significant tax internal control issues include
problems in the process for recording the deferred tax asset position or performing book and tax
reconciliation; staffing shortages, including relating to a failure to “separate the three key functions of
transaction authorization, transaction recording, and handling of assets,” and errors in accounting for
unusual or complex transactions or foreign operations. Shoulders, supra note 85.
87
Brad L. Brown, KPMG LLP & James Wolfrom, Ernst & Young, LLP, Presentation at the SJSU/TEI
High Technology Tax Institute (Nov. 7, 2005).
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these matters with the Section 404 auditor augments the tax decisionmaking group by one
and increases the internal transparency of that group’s decisions.88
C. Other Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions That Increase the Tax Decisionmaking
Group’s Internal Transparency.
Other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are designed to ensure review of tax director
(and other manager) decisions by senior managers and the board. One such provision
requires CEOs and CFOs to certify quarterly financial reports.89 An officer who
knowingly or willfully falsely certifies that a report is fair and materially complete faces
criminal penalties.90 This quarterly certification requirement has produced subcertification practices at some companies, which require managers including the tax
director to sign certification statements with respect to their areas of responsibility on a
quarterly basis.91
Another relevant Sarbanes-Oxley provision is audit committee review of financial
statements.92 The statute requires an audit committee comprised of independent
members of the corporation’s Board of Directors.93 This committee is required to collect
and review reports from the corporation’s auditor regarding “critical accounting policies
and practices” and possible alternative GAAP-compliant accounting treatments.94 The
certification and audit committee oversight reinforce the top-down tendency of norm
development within corporations, which was discussed in Part I, and add a statutorily
mandated compliance element to that chain of command.
Practitioner observations indicate that these provisions have in fact resulted in
increased oversight from corporations’ audit committees.95 Tax directors report that
material or substantive tax items or items that arise in Section 404 audits often receive
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See infra Part II.D (describing erosion of attorney-client and other privileges).
See 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (codifying Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (requiring quarterly certifications
as to the correctness and completeness of financial reports and internal controls).
90
See 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (codifying Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (providing criminal penalties
including fines up to $1,000,000 or imprisonment of up to 10 years).
91
See TCPI 2004 Survey, supra note 82, at 5 (reporting that 19% of tax director respondents faced
subcertification requirements and that 78% experienced new information collection procedures).
92
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(k) (codifying Section 204 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (requiring public corporation
auditors to make reports to audit committees).
93
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j1-(m) (codifying Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (requiring an independent audit
committee and defining independence as requiring no fee relationship or affiliation between a board
member and the corporation).
94
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(k).
95
See, e.g., “Ernst & Young Analyzes Tax Transparency Dynamics,” supra note 3 (“Perhaps the most
tangible sign of how companies have responded to the new environment is the re-emergence of strong
oversight and active involvement of public company audit committees in all aspects of financial risk
management, including tax risk management. Audit committees are asking more questions about tax[,
including] such matter[s] as risk profile, critical accounting policies embedded in tax decisions and the
status of potential tax controversies.”).
89
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specific audit committee review.96 Audit committee reactions may include asking for a
second opinion or increasing the opinion standard required before approving the
transaction.
Don Korb, who currently serves as IRS Chief Counsel, had the following
observation about his pre-government experience in practice with a post-Sarbanes-Oxley
audit committee: “Sarbanes-Oxley created the milieu, created the meeting. Those guys
[on the audit committee] didn’t know anything about the rule that the IRS put out. What
they understood was they better pay attention to what the hell is going on. So that’s why
the meeting happened. And then the professional [Korb] shows up and explains to them
that even though this [proposed transaction] might work . . . they still faced this risk . . .
and they made a judgment not to do it.”97
D. Internal Transparency Begets External Transparency
One result of increased internal control regulation and increased audit committee
oversight is that financial and Section 404 auditors demand more information about tax
planning.98 A 2004 PCAOB release further contributes to this development by requiring
audit documentation that provides the “basis for the auditor’s conclusions concerning
every relevant financial statement assertion.”99 The leading accountants’ trade group, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, or AICPA, backs this broad standard
by specifically anticipating auditors’ access to opinions of outside counsel
“notwithstanding potential concerns regarding attorney-client or other forms of
privilege.”100
Disclosure of tax planning advice to auditors and audit committee examination of
tax planning primarily increases the transparency of tax decisions within the corporation
and among its advisors. But there is a broader transparency effect as well, since such
disclosure waives any attorney-client or accountant-client privilege with respect to such
96

See TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1, at 34 (reporting that audit committee reviewed material tax items in
82% of cases, substantive tax issues in 63% of cases, and tax elements of Section 404 reports in 59% of
cases).
97
Unofficial Transcript Is Available of Forum on Tax Shelters,” 2005 TNT 40-63 (Mar. 2, 2005) (quoting
Don Korb).
98
See Sheryl Stratton, “Lawyers Discuss Postshelter Assault on Privilege,” 2005 TNT 71-5 (Apr. 14, 2005)
(reporting on comments at an ABA teleconference by former IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams, now in
practice at Shearman & Sterling, who stated that auditors demand more information to support the tax
provision after Sarbanes-Oxley, and that attorney efforts to resist handing over information in the interest
of protecting attorney-client privilege did not always succeed); Thomas W. White, “The Growing Tension
Between Auditors and Lawyers,” Directors Monthly 8, 10 (October 2004) (reporting a “tug-of-war among
auditors and attorneys” as a result of auditor information and representation requests that significantly
exceeded the standard requests of the past 30 or so years). In a 2004 survey, 73% of responding tax
directors responded that their “level of documented support for tax contingency reserves [had] increased in
the past two years.” TCPI 2004 Survey, supra note 82 at 10. A 2006 survey showed that 74% of
responding tax directors had provided outside counsel tax opinions to auditors. TCPI 2006 Survey, supra
note 1 at 23.
99
PCAOB Release 2004-006 A1-4 (June 9, 2004).
100
AIPCA, The Standards of Field Work § 9326.22 (2004 ed.).
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advice101 (although work-product protection may remain in some cases).102 There is no
accountant-client privilege protecting audit workpapers from disclosure.103 A recently
added section of the tax code purports to provide a tax practitioner-client privilege that
provides some protection for tax advice given by accountants.104 However, recent cases
in the tax shelter context have established a narrow scope for the statutory accountantclient privilege and indicated that the attorney-client and tax practitioner-client privileges
often do not apply to tax advice, such as when the advisor acts in a promoter capacity
rather than a legal advisor capacity105 or when the advisor prepares tax returns.106
These developments lead many practitioners to believe that their work generally
will not enjoy any privilege protection.107 One might expect that practitioners would
avoid putting legal advice in writing as a result of such privilege concerns (and also
because heightened opinion standards make written advice more expensive).108 Such a
reluctance to provide written advice might decrease, rather than increase, communication
101

According to the classic Wigmore formulation of the attorney-client, “[w]here legal advice of any kind
is sought, from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that
purpose, made in confidence, by the client, are at his instance permanently protected, from disclosure by
himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection be waived.” 101 See 8 Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 2294
(McNaughton rev. 1961). The client may waive the privilege by disclosing it to a third person outside the
attorney-client relationship, such as an auditor or even the government in a tax return or other filing. See,
e.g., United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that tax return filing waived
privilege).
102
There is no automatic waiver of the work-product privilege in the event of disclosure to a third party
other than the adversary. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461, 464, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (concluding that Martha Stewart’s disclosure to her daughter of her attorney’s communication
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and clients because Jenkins & Gilchrist and KPMG did not provide individualized tax or legal advice but
rather marketed identical tax shelter packages).
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are entitled to privilege when they are doing other than lawyers’ work”); United States v. KPMG LLP, 237
F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that advice relating to tax return preparation provided by
accountants is not privileged).
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and internal transparency. But although the reaction of requesting less written advice has
been observed, it does not clearly prevail.109 Perhaps auditors’ demand for
documentation still mandates written advice for tax matters with material financial
accounting consequences.
E. What Causal Effect Does Sarbanes-Oxley Have on Tax Compliance?
This Article argues that the larger and more visible post-Sarbanes-Oxley tax
decisionmaking group amplifies the compliance tendencies of each of its members.
These compliance tendencies depend in part on the possibility of tax-related significant
deficiencies or material weaknesses under Section 404, which carry adverse reputations
consequences, including possible loss of employment.110 They also depend on the
enforcement measures and professional standards described in Part III. Some of the
enforcement elements described in Part III (such as Circular 230 enforcement standards)
directly impact members of the tax decisionmaking group. Others (such as prominent
criminal cases lodged against CEOs in connection with accounting scandals) do not
directly impact such group members. But they have an indirect effect because of the
strong influence organization leaders (like CEOS) exert on their subordinates (like tax
directors).111
This Article does not offer rigorous empirical proof that Sarbanes-Oxley is a
necessary piece of this tax shelter compliance puzzle. Nevertheless, the story of a larger
and more transparent group that amplifies compliance tendencies fostered by
enforcement squares with the descriptions given by practitioners and government
officials. Current government officials cite Sarbanes-Oxley as a factor that facilitates
their efforts to increase public companies’ tax compliance.112 Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley,
IRS and Treasury reported frustration with their efforts to crack down on promoted tax
shelters (although the relevant tax shelter rules were also changed in 2002).113 Larry
Langdon, the former commissioner of the IRS large and mid-size business division
(“LMSB”) who is now in private practice, has observed that a strong anti-tax shelter
109
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norm does not appear in private corporations not subject to Sarbanes-Oxley.114 Finally,
survey evidence shows that Sarbanes-Oxley compliance requires a significant share of
tax directors’ energy and time.115
III.

Why Tax Decisionmakers Now Worry About Personal and Firm Liability

The expanded and more transparent tax decisionmaking group described in Part II
did not alone foster the development of a tax compliance norm. The group norm
development literature discussed in Part I indicates that decreased personal responsibility
and corporate hierarchy can allow corporate norms to overrule individual norms.116
Moreover, as described in Part I, corporate norms often display aggressive, risk-taking
tendencies due to organizational behavior phenomena such as optimism bias.117 Parts I
and II alone might suggest that groups whose work is transparent within an organization
may more efficiently experience pressure to develop group norms that favor profit
seeking (or effective tax rate minimization) over compliance. This Part III explains the
reasons for the liability and adverse publicity concerns of the members of the tax
decisionmaking group and the people they work for, which contribute significantly to the
compliance-oriented nature of the recently developed group norm.118
A. Criminal Prosecution and Other Enforcement Efforts Directed at Corporate
Managers
Numerous recent enforcement initiatives combine to make corporate executives
and managers worry about possible personal and firm civil and criminal liability. Big
criminal prosecutions and convictions of top corporate managers have recently grown out
of accounting and securities fraud charges at Adelphia,119 Enron,120 HealthSouth,121
Tyco122 and Worldcom,123 among others. Some cases have also involved civil federal
114
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charges and private lawsuits, generating significant monetary penalties.124 Some
directors have made settlement payments out of their own pockets.125
Criminal and monetary penalties in these non-tax corporate manager cases have
particular impact on the corporate hierarchy and culture within which the tax director
works, because of the strong influence top executives wield over the ethics of their
subordinate managers and the corporation as a whole.126 Increased IRS audit and
enforcement activity127 aimed at corporate taxpayers also directly impact the tax director.
Other measures, discussed below in Part III.B, target gatekeepers such as tax planners
and auditors.
B. Gatekeeper Liability: Criminal Enforcement, Civil Liability and Circular 230
The idea of imposing liability on gatekeepers in an effort to prevent principals
from engaging in misconduct has enjoyed significant academic attention.128 The precise
definition of “gatekeeper” is sometimes elusive,129 but in the context of the tax
decisionmaking group considered by this Article, three of the four members – the tax
planner, the financial auditor and the Section 404 auditor – qualify as agents who can
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“disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers.”130 Recent
enforcement efforts targeting gatekeepers increase the likelihood that they will do so.
1. Criminal Prosecution of Gatekeepers.
The criminal prosecution of Arthur Andersen on charges of obstruction of justice
in connection with the government’s investigation of Enron provides one example of this
phenomenon. When the jury returned a guilty verdict,131 Andersen imploded. The
Supreme Court’s subsequent reversal of the conviction132 came too late to save the
firm.133
The Andersen case also apparently deterred the government from mounting
another criminal prosecution with the power to destroy another large audit firm. In the
KPMG tax shelter case, the government’s criminal enforcement efforts consist instead of
a deferred prosecution agreement with the firm and criminal prosecution of individual
employees.
KPMG was not alone in developing and marketing tax products in the 1990s, but
other firms that did so made the decision to settle with the government.134 KPMG
initially fought back. However, KPMG’s defense sagged in the face of emerging
information, including a Senate minority report, about KPMG’s systematic tax product
development and marketing practices, its strategies to conceal the products’ existence or
details from the IRS and cavalier dismissal of the likelihood that large penalties could be
imposed on the firm.135
The Justice Department believed that the evidence that KPMG had pushed
fraudulent transactions marked by untrue representations about business purpose and the
like supported criminal charges against the firm.136 But the parties knew of the market
risks of ruining KPMG with a criminal indictment; a demise of KPMG would have left
130

Kraakman, supra note 128, 2 J. L. Econ. & Org. at 53 (1986).
See United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 374 F. 3d 281, 302 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming guilty jury
verdict), rev’d by 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
132
See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 125 S. Ct. 2129, 2131-32 (2005) (overruling
guilty jury verdict on grounds that jury instructions did not properly articulate the knowing intent element
of the obstruction of justice charge).
133
See Joseph A. Grundfest, “Over Before It Started,” N.Y. Times, June 14, 2005 (stating that “Andersen
was destroyed when it was indicted”).
134
See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, “How an Accounting Firm Went from Resistance to Resignation,” N.Y.
Times, Aug. 28, 2005 (noting early settlements of Ernst & Young and PricewaterhouseCoopers).
135
See “U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals: Four
KPMG Case Studies: FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and SC2,” Minority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., S.
Prt. 108-34, at 7-16 (2003) (describing KPMG’s development, marketing and concealment of tax products).
See also Tanina Rostain, “Travails in Tax: KPMG and the Tax-Shelter Controversy,” __, __ in Legal
Ethics Stories (Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban eds., 2006) (describing disclosures by KPMG
whistleblower Michael Hamersley).
136
See Information at 4-5, United States v. KPMG LLP, No. 05 Cr. _____ (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2005)
(describing elements of fraud including false representations and statements in tax opinion letters).
131

25

only three US-based global accounting firms.137 Instead, the parties entered into a
deferred prosecution agreement, which drew heavily from the Justice Department’s
corporate cooperation blueprint articulated in its 2003 Thompson memo.138
Under the agreement, KPMG must pay $456 million and the Justice Department
agreed not to pursue its prosecution of KPMG for criminal fraud and conspiracy
charges.139 KPMG also agreed to limitations on its tax practice such as heightened
opinion letter standards and a prohibition on marketing any “pre-packaged tax product”
or providing any confidential tax services.140 And, importantly, it agreed to “cooperate”
with the government. The cooperation agreement, following the Thompson memo
model, requires waiver of attorney-client privilege and provision of any requested
information, including information about current and former KPMG partners and
employees, to the government.141
Criminal fraud and conspiracy charges were filed and are still pending against 16
former KPMG partners, one lawyer, and an investment advisor.142 One former KPMG
partner has pled guilty.143 With respect to the individual criminal charges, the correct
substantive outcome is unclear, in part because no court has passed on the legality of the
underlying tax shelters.144 The government responds to this charge by explaining that the
underlying legality does not matter in light of evidently false representations made by
KPMG and drafted by KPMG for attestation by its clients.145 But since many of the
false representations related to the existence of a “real” business transaction, some
commentators and the defense argue that the representations boil down to a view about
whether the underlying transaction had enough substance in the first place and that the
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question of whether the tax shelters themselves were legal is the only appropriate starting
point.146
Even if the individual defendants find vindication on substantive ground,
however, the pending criminal case against individual KPMG partners has practitioners
particularly worried because the government approach appears to have weakened
employers’ willingness to protect their employees.147 In KPMG, the firm insulated itself
from prosecution by identifying employees as bad apples, withdrawing attorney fee and
other support from them, and waiving attorney-client privilege. Practitioners have
responded with great anxiety to the possibility of being scapegoated.148 This government
approach may have lost part of its bite: the judge in the KPMG case ruled that
government pressure on KPMG to withhold legal support from its former partners
violated the partners’ constitutional rights to substantive due process and assistance of
counsel.149 But some commentators speculate that this may simply encourage employers
to make clear that they will not pay to defend criminal or civil charges brought against
employees arising out of their employment.150
2. Monetary Penalties and Civil Litigation.
The criminal prosecution and deferred prosecution agreement described above is
not the end of the matter for KPMG. It faces ongoing private party fraud and malpractice
claims. 151 Proposed settlements amount to hundreds of millions of dollars,152 on top of
the approximately $450 million that KPMG must pay in connection with its deferred
prosecution agreement.153
Several of the other Big Four accounting firms – which include Deloitte &
Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers -- have also faced stiff
146
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fines or other sanctions such as restrictions on individuals’ ability to practice in recent
years. Settlements may arise from shareholder class-action lawsuits154 or SEC
investigations.155 The charges typically relate to the audit firms’ failure to catch and stop
accounting irregularities. These monetary settlements have been described as a recent
trend, representing a change developing in the last decade or so,156 although firms also
reached large settlements in the early 1990s with respect to the savings and loan
debacle.157 Accountants’ apparently escalating anxiety is captured, among other places,
at a website launched in June 2000, accountingmalpractice.com, which lists emerging
reasons for increased malpractice exposure and sells tools to reduce it.
3. Circular 230.
The Circular 230 rules158 set forth the standards with which a tax advisor must
comply in order to be eligible to practice before the IRS by, for example, representing a
client in an audit situation or filing documents (beyond tax returns) on behalf of a client
with the IRS.159 The government has amended and updated Circular 230 several times in
the last several years.160 Circular 230 sets forth threshold requirements for an individual
to be permitted to practice before the IRS,161 articulates practice standards,162 describes
reasons for disciplinary action,163 and establishes enforcement mechanisms which may
lead, for example, to the sanction of prohibition of future practice before the IRS.164 An
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IRS sanction may further lead to disbarment or revocation of a CPA license to practice,
and may prevent the sanctioned individual from participating in a partnership with other,
unsanctioned practitioners.165
At least two recent developments in Circular 230 have received significant
practitioner attention.166 The first relates to tax opinions, and provides standards that
“covered opinions” must meet in order to provide a taxpayer with “reasonable cause”
protection against penalties.167 One category of covered opinions is particularly broad:
reliance opinions, which constitute written advice that “concludes at a confidence level of
at least more likely than not . . . that one or more significant Federal tax issues would be
resolved in the taxpayer’s favor.”168 However, an opinion that includes a disclaimer
stating that it may not be used for penalty protection purposes does not count as a covered
reliance opinion.169
A practitioner delivering a valid covered opinion must not rely on any factual
assumptions or representations that he or she should know are unreasonable170 and must
provide a conclusion as to each significant federal tax issue unless explicit agreement
regarding a “limited scope opinion” is made with the client.171 These requirements of
broad investigation of facts and broad analysis of law make covered opinions elaborate
and expensive exercises. And the broad definition of reliance opinions has persuaded
some practitioners that every email communication might be a reliance communication,
giving rise to a ubiquitous practice of placing Circular 230 disclaimers stating that advice
may not be used for penalty protection purposes at the bottom of every law firm email, in
an effort to take the communication out of the “covered opinion” definition.172
The goal of the ubiquitous disclaimer is to avoid the possibility of Circular 230
sanctions as a result of a covered opinion that failed to meet the applicable standards. As
mentioned above, violations of Circular 230 can lead to loss of the privilege of practicing
before the IRS or other sanctions. Related penalties such as inability to partner with
another, unsanctioned practitioner, loss of state-issued professional licenses, or
165
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reputational harm can follow from IRS sanctions. Prior to the current Circular 230
amendments, general professional ethics rules governed non-tax shelter tax opinions173
and tax shelter opinions were narrowly defined,174 so that the sanction of losing the
privilege of practicing before the IRS did directly not tie to opinion standards. Moreover,
another revised Circular 230 provision charges the persons responsible for tax practice
within a firm to ensure that others in the firm comply with Circular 230 rules.175
The second element of the Circular 230 overhaul that has attracted significant
attention is the development of a more aggressive and more public enforcement office.
The former Office of Practice was renamed the Office of Professional Responsibility, or
OPR, and its staff doubled in size.176 OPR reportedly wants to increase the impact of
disciplinary procedures, in part by pursuing prominent cases that it hopes can more
broadly influence practitioner behavior.177 OPR has also taken the controversial step of
proposing public, not private, disciplinary proceedings when a case reaches the
administrative law judge stage.178 The proposal has drawn significant practitioner
criticism because of the perceived in terrorem effect of publicity.179
Circular 230 is one important reason why one member of the tax decisionmaking
group – the tax planner – feels an increased incentive to behave in compliance with the
law. The perceived broadening of responsibility for investigating a client’s facts and
relevant law, at least for purposes of penalty protection opinions, and the tougher and
more public approach of OPR makes practitioners worry more about the possibility of
enforcement. Moreover, the provision that establishes supervisory responsibility for tax
practice heads plants this worry within the context of the firm hierarchy, making it more
likely that the Circular 230 concerns of a junior associate at a law firm, for example, will
be reinforced by interactions with the partner who leads the firm’s tax department.
C. Publicity
The media spotlight has shone on scandal in recent years, and this, too, makes tax
decisionmakers anxious. Many of the authorities cited in the immediately preceding
sections are newspaper articles. Scandal is big news, both general corporate scandal and
tax-specific scandal.
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See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at § 503.2.1, at 418 (outlining professional rules).
See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at § 503.4.2.1, at 426 (providing definition of tax
shelter under prior rules).
175
See Circular 230 § 10.36(a) (imposing responsibilities on tax practice leader).
176
See Schneider, Dixon & Hymel, supra note 160, at TAN 98 – 99 (describing new OPR).
177
See Dennis B. Drapkin, “ABA Tax Section Submits Comments on Disciplinary Procedures of IRS
Office of Professional Responsibility,” 2005 TNT 236-18, at TAN 7-10 (Dec. 9, 2005) (reporting OPR
intention to shift its enforcement focus).
178
See Proposed Circular 230 § 10.72 (proposing open proceedings).
179
See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, “Transparency at the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility: A Two-Way
Street?,” 110 Tax Notes 579, ___ (Feb. 6, 2006) (describing comments of prominent practitioners that open
proceedings will permit the IRS to ruin a practitioner’s reputation without regard to the validity of the
charge).
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A tax planner is always wary of the intrepid Lee Sheppard, of Tax Notes, and her
colleagues. But major newspaper reporters of late have been known to undertake detailed
public record examination in search of a tax shelter story.180 A recent bestseller by New
York Times reporter David Cay Johnston showcases investigative tax journalism with
chapters lambasting individual and company tax strategies such as Stanley Works’
proposed inversion transaction.181 A recent PBS “Frontline” report on tax shelters also
raised the issue’s profile.182
The government plays more than a standby role in this media saga. They issue
press releases about their pursuit of tax cheats, sometimes based settlement deals with
taxpayers that include the taxpayer’s waiver of certain confidentiality rights.183 They
publicize settlement offers about tax strategies whose legality has not yet been
adjudicated – and then publicize the billions of dollars of revenue that result from the
settlement offers.184 They publicize the KPMG case, and the details of that firm’s
deferred prosecution deal.
The perceived increased possibility of adverse media attention has led
practitioners – including the Big Four accounting firms – to formally note the adverse
impact that tax planning can have on corporate reputation.185 Ernst & Young describes
successive trends in tax planning, from cost-cutting in the 1980s to lowering effective tax
rates in the 1990s to protecting corporate reputation today.186 And conference
participants buzz anxiously about the possibility of landing on the front page of the Wall
Street Journal.187
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See, e.g., Jonathan Weil, “KPMG Used Its Own Tax Shelter,” Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 2005, at C1 (naming
KPMG and six other companies as purchasers of a particular product marketed by KPMG).
181
See David Cay Johnston, Perfectly Legal, 231-252 (2003).
182
“Frontline: Tax Me If You Can” (PBS television broadcast [Feb. 19, 2003]) (presenting corporate tax
shelter expose).
183
See Statement of Eileen J. O’Connor, supra note 127, at 21 (noting that Justice Department Tax Division
has begun issuing press releases with respect to civil and criminal cases during her tenure as its head); see,
e.g., Press Release, IRS Accepts Settlement Offer on Contingent Liability Tax Shelter (Dec. 16, 2004)
available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=132350,00.html (“Hercules [taxpayer] has further
agreed to a limited waiver of the taxpayer privacy and anti-disclosure rules in connection with this press
release.”). The Hercules settlement followed two prominent government court setbacks in contingent
liability cases. See TaxProf Blog, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2004/12/irs_settles_her.html
(Dec. 16, 2004) (noting IRS losses in Black & Decker and Coltec).
184
See infra TAN 201-202 (describing IRS announcements regarding tax shelter settlement offers).
185
Martin A. Sullivan, “Economic Analysis – Reputation or Lower Taxes,” Tax Notes, Aug. 29, 2005, at
981 (reporting on reports put out by each of the Big Four accounting firms and noting that the focus of
media and government attention is on “‘aggressive’ or ‘socially irresponsible’” but not necessarily tax
evasive behavior).
186
Ernst & Young study – “Taxes in the Boardroom – A Discussion Paper.”
187
E.g. John Brennan presentation at SJSU/TEI High Technology Tax Institute, Nov. 8, 2005. See also
“Ernst & Young Analyzes Tax Transparency Dynamics,” 2006 TNT 69-10 (Apr. 10, 2006) (“Senior
management and board members sometimes refer to . . . “The Wall Street Journal” factor. This is the fear
of being the subject of media coverage arising from a transaction, including a tax planning transaction, that
might raise the concerns of stakeholders . . . and inflict damage to corporate reputations and stock prices.”).
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IV. A Clear Government Message
In Part II, this Article described the emergence of an expanded and more
transparent public corporation tax decisionmaking group that amplified its members’
compliance tendencies. In Part III, this Article explained that recent criminal
enforcement, civil liability, professional standard, and publicity efforts cause members of
this decisionmaking group to worry more about personal and firm liability. This Part IV
provides the final piece to the organizational behavior puzzle of the recent creation of a
tax compliance norm at public corporations: the clear government identification of
acceptable, and unacceptable, activities, particularly in the tax shelter area. It also
explores the reaction of public corporation tax decisionmaking groups to a new financial
accounting standard for uncertain tax positions.
A. The Tax Shelter Problem
In the 1990s, major accounting and other tax advisory firms engaged in
significant tax shelter development and marketing efforts. The tax shelter products
typically involved hypertechnical readings of Code or regulation provisions188 and
possessed a “cookie-cutter” quality: promoters could market them to many taxpayers. In
the late 1990s, media reports described heavily marketed strategies undertaken for tax
reasons alone, with no real business purpose.189 In 1999, Treasury released a report on
shelters190 that catalogued the available substantive provisions,191 disclosure and penalty
requirements,192 and case law doctrines limiting or regulating tax shelters,193 as well as
describing several types of transactions that made the government hopping mad.
The “son-of-BOSS” loss generation transaction provides an example. Each of the
Big Four accounting firms marketed this or a similar transaction between 1997-2000,
often targeting taxpayers who had just sold corporate stock at a gain. One variation
featured the contribution of offsetting positions (purchased for the purpose of engaging in
the tax shelter transaction) consisting of one position with built-in gain and one position
with built-in loss to a corporation or partnership. The net economic value of the two
positions taken together was close to zero; a taxpayer purchased them for the purpose of
engaging in the transaction at nominal cost. The loss side of the position typically
involved a contingent liability or an interest component, which the taxpayer argued
should not reduce the basis of the corporate stock or partnership interest. The taxpayer
188

See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at 139 (contrasting recent trend with individual tax
shelters of the 1970s and 1980s, which made use of tax preferences contemplated by the Code or
regulations).
189
See, e.g., Janet Novack & Laura Saunders, “The Hustling of X-Rated Shelters,” Forbes, Dec. 14, 1998,
at 198, __ (describing practice of aggressively marketing questionable tax products).
190
See 1999 Treasury Report, supra note 7.
191
Id. at 35-36 (giving examples of general anti-abuse provisions, specific statutory responses to specific
tax shelter problems, and statutory grants of broad regulatory authority).
192
Id. at 58-76 (reviewing tax shelter registration and other requirements from the 1980s effort against
personal tax shelters and a 1997 law strengthening penalties applicable to corporate tax shelters).
193
Id. at 46-58 (outlining substance-over-form, step transaction, business purpose and economic substance
doctrines).
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took the position that the basis of the stock or partnership interest increased by the high
basis of the built-in gain position, but did not decrease by the full amount of the loss
position, based on a technical reading of Section 752 (in the case of a partnership interest)
or Section 358 (in the case of corporate stock). Then the taxpayer sold the stock or
partnership interest, with its high basis, for its true, lower economic value, and claimed a
loss. 194
Promoters aggressively marketed tax shelter products. In one instance, a shelter
appropriate for S corporation shareholders was marketed through a telemarketing firm
that cold-called owners of S corporations throughout the country.195 Another marketing
technique, appropriate for public corporation tax directors, involved the cross-selling of
tax product services by audit partners who arranged meetings between the tax directors at
their audit clients and the tax consultants at the audit firm. The tax consultants could
propose products precisely tailored to the needs of the corporate client, since those needs
were well-known by the audit team.196
At its peak in the late 1990s tax product work may have represented as much as
10% of some accounting firms’ global revenues and as much as 25% of US revenues.197
It also resulted in significant losses to the U.S. fisc. Tax shelter revenue loss measures
are notoriously difficult to estimate, 198 but most attempts indicate at least $10 billion
annually during the late 1990s.199 IRS estimated tax losses at up to $85 billion from
listed and nonlisted transactions as of September 30, 2003.200 The results of tax shelter
settlement offers made by the IRS also give some idea of the magnitude of the losses.
The son-of-BOSS 2004 settlement offer attracted 1200 taxpayers and generated $3.7
billion in taxes, interest and penalties.201 A settlement offer covering numerous other
194

See Notice 2000-44, 2000 CB 255; Joseph Bankman, “The Tax Shelter Problem,” 57 N’tl Tax J. 925,
926-27 (2004) (describing son-of-BOSS shelter).
195
See S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 34, 39-40 (describing KPMG telemarketing center and its use in marketing
SC2 shelter).
196
See id. at 36-38 (describing cooperation between tax product and audit teams in designing and
marketing products).
197
See id. at 11-12 (reporting KPMG worldwide revenue of $10.7 billion and KPMG US revenue of $4
billion in 2002 and peak annual tax shelter revenue of $1.2 billion).
198
The difference between book and tax income is frequently used as an accessible but imperfect measure
of corporate tax shelter activity. See, e.g. Desai. However, one recent study was unable to confirm the
existence or growth of tax sheltering activity based on an examination of book and tax income. See Gil B.
Manzon, Jr. & George A. Plesko, “The Relation Between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of
Income,” 55 Tax L. Rev. 175, 177 (2002).
199
See Slemrod, supra note 5, at 880 & n. 9 (citing IRS contractor estimate of $14.8 – 18.4 billion in 1999
and Professor Bankman’s 1999 estimate of $10 billion for abusive shelters targeted at corporations and
wealthy individuals). This amount is material, though not overwhelming, in the context of the estimated
$350 billion annual tax gap. See “IRS Announces Results of Study on Tax Gap,” 2005 TNT 60-5 (Mar.
29, 2005) (noting that National Research Program study indicated a tax gap of $312 to $353 billion in 2001
and that most of the tax gap derives from underreporting by self-employed individuals and small
businesses).
200
See U.S. General Accounting Office, Challenges Remain in Combating Abusive Tax Shelters 11 (2003)
[hereinafter GAO 2003 Report] (providing data and noting that potential tax loss amounts do not consider
reductions that might result during examination and appeal).
201
See “IRS Announces Success of Taxpayer Settlement Initiatives,” 2005 TNT 132-7 (July 12, 2005).
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shelters, which closed in January 2005, attracted an estimated 2000 taxpayers and
generated an estimated $2 billion.202
Costs other than direct revenue loss also result from tax shelter activity.203 They
include wasted time and money in the form of uneconomic tax planning and resulting
enforcement efforts,204 increased complexity as a result of statutory response to perceived
abuse,205 and the degeneration of the voluntary compliance that underlies the U.S. income
tax system (aside from wage withholding) in the first place. With respect to the last point,
sociologists have noted the phenomenon of taxpayers drawing on and copying each
others’ normative decisions, commenting that the “right” decision from a taxpayer’s
perspective depends on context, as evidenced by empirical data suggesting that compliant
taxpayers believe that other taxpayers also comply, while noncompliant taxpayers believe
that other taxpayers also engage in fraud.206
B. Drawing the Tax Shelter Line
Having identified corporate tax shelters as a problem, the government faced the
task of how to attack them. When Treasury’s 1999 white paper emerged, regulations
such as the requirement to register certain confidential corporate transactions with “a
significant purpose of tax avoidance” already existed, though they (evidently) did not
stem the corporate tax shelter tide.207 More recently, and contemporaneously with the
Sarbanes-Oxley and enforcement developments described in Parts III and IV, the
government has used two principal tools to define the line between acceptable business
tax planning and tax shelters. The first tool is litigation. The second tool is disclosure
regulations.
1. Litigation.
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See “Global Settlement Offer May Net 2000 Taxpayers, $2 Billion, Everson Says,” 2006 TNT 59-1
(Mar. 27, 2006) (reporting on results of settlement offered in Announcement 2006-80, 2005-46 I.R.B.
967).
203
See 1999 Treasury Report, supra note 190, at iv.
204
Some go so far as to assert that nearly all tax planning is worthless. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, “Ten
Truths About Tax Shelters,” 55 Tax L. Rev. 215, 222-225 (2002) (asserting that tax planning is a negative
externality although acknowledging that planning to avoid taxpayer-adverse mistakes in the law may have
value).
205
See James S. Eustice, “Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” in New Bottles,” 55 Tax L. Rev.
135, 161-62 (2002) (arguing that legislation often generates more problems than it solves).
206
See, e.g., John S. Carroll, “How Taxpayers Think About Their Taxes: Frames and Values,” in Why
People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement 43, 47 (Joel Slemrod, ed., 1992).
207
See I.R.C. § 6111(d) (requiring registration of a transaction with a significant purpose of avoidance or
evasion of federal income tax by a corporation, where the transaction is offered under conditions of
confidentiality and the promoter may receive a fee that exceeds $100,000). See also Wolfman, Holden &
Harris, supra note 102, at 137–40 (describing the history of tax shelters, including the episode of
aggressively marketed individual tax products in the 1970s and 1980s); id. at 149-59 (outlining 1994 law
change that raised the opinion standard for corporate tax shelters for purposes of the substantial
understatement penalty in Section 6664(c) and the 1997 change requiring registration of certain
confidential transactions in Section 6111(d)).
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The government has generally challenged alleged tax shelter transactions with
substance-over-form arguments. That is, the government claims that such transactions’
form should not be respected because they lack economic substance or business
purpose.208 A full survey of recent corporate tax shelter cases is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, the section below outlines several of the more prominent cases and
attempts to give the mixed-results flavor of the litigation.
The government scored an early win in ACM Partnership, in which the Tax Court
disallowed partnership losses disproportionately allocated to Colgate Palmolive under a
scheme involving a product marketed by Merrill Lynch, a tax-indifferent partner, and a
technical interpretation of the contingent payment installment sale rules.209 The ACM
court focused in the lack of an economic profit that exceeded transaction costs in
reaching its conclusion that the transaction lacked economic substance, but failed to
provide much detail regarding that standard, including how much profit would be enough
or whether the economic substance and business purpose tests were independent.210 The
Third Circuit affirmed.211
Since ACM, the government has scored several trial and appellate victories. The
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Tax Court in Winn-Dixie that the taxpayer could not
deduct interest derived from the corporation’s borrowing against life insurance policies it
owned on the lives of its employees, agreeing that the program lacked economic
substance where the paid interest and fees exceeded the policies’ expected return and also
finding no business purpose.212 The Second Circuit upheld an unusual 40% gross
valuation misstatement penalty assessed against Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) with respect to a loss-generation partnership transaction that was based in part
on the false representation of LTCM that it had a valid business purpose for the
transaction.213 The Fourth Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment
for the taxpayer in Black & Decker, concluding that court had to hear expert witnesses
and consider more carefully the IRS argument that the taxpayer lacked an objective profit
motive.214 And in Coltec, the Federal Circuit, reversing the Court of Claims, concluded
208

See Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 184, 209 (1983) (indicating that a transaction should be
respected as valid if it either has business purpose or “possesses some modicum of economic substance”),
aff’d, 752 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1985). See also Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at 169-171
(noting subjective business purpose element and objective profit motive elements of economic substance
inquiry).
209
See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M (CCH) 2189 (1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 157 F.3d 231
(3d Cir. 1988).
210
See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at 177-78 (analyzing ACM).
211
See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 263 (affirming disallowance of noneconomic losses) (3d
Cir. 1998), aff’g in part and rev’g in part 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997).
212
See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting unchallenged
finding that program could not generate a pre-tax profit and that program lacked any real business motive),
aff’g 113 T.C. 254 (1999).
213
See Long-Term Capital Holdings, LP v. United States, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 20988 (2d Cir. Sept. 27,
2005) (per curiam), aff’g 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004).
214
See Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 440-43 (2006) (noting that Black & Decker
had stipulated for purposes of summary judgment that the transaction was tax-motivated and criticizing the
district court’s failure to thoroughly consider IRS evidence tending to show lack of an objective profit
motive), aff’g in part and rev’g in part 340 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 2004). But see Karen C. Burke,
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that a contingent liability transaction lacked economic substance, rejecting the taxpayer’s
claim that assigning contingent asbestos liabilities to a different subsidiary had business
purpose.215
However, some of the government’s trial court victories have been reversed by
appellate courts. Two cases involving a taxpayer’s participation in a marketed and
prepackaged foreign tax credit product demonstrate the difficulty of deciding on a metric
to use in computing pre-tax profit. In Compaq and IES, the purchase of non-U.S.
corporate stock (in the form of American Depositary Receipts, or ADRs) immediately
before the dividend record date and the sale of the same stock immediately after the
dividend record date generated offsetting dividend income and capital loss and a bonus
foreign tax credit.216 The lower courts concluded, after treating the foreign tax as an
expense, that there was not economic profit.217 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits concluded
that a measure of pre-tax profit should not treat foreign tax as an expense, and reversed
the Tax Court.218 Another case reveals courts’ reluctance to disregard transactions with
unrelated third parties. In UPS, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court in respecting
the taxpayer’s transfer of its excess value insurance business to a related Bermuda
corporation through a reinsurance agreement with an unrelated firm.219
This mixed case law does not draw a clear line between acceptable and
unacceptable transactions. Indeed, courts appear to disagree on the appropriate legal
standard: the cases fail to explain whether a transaction must possess both business
purpose and an objective profit motive in order to be sustained.220 Legislation clarifying
the economic substance standard is sometimes proposed.221 But prominent commentators
“Black & Decker in the Fourth Circuit: Tax Shelters and Textualism,” 111 Tax Notes 315, Pt. IV (Apr. 17,
2006) (noting that, despite pro-government economic substance decision, Fourth Circuit’s textualist
approach to statutory interpretation of Section 357 ignored secondary sources and might encourage rigid
technical readings of statutes by tax shelter designers).
215
See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, No. 05-5111, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 17351 (Fed. Cir. July 12,
2006), at *45-*54, vacating and remanding 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004) (discussing economic substance issue).
216
See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at 183 (describing transaction).
217
See Compaq Computer Corp., supra note 20, 113 T.C. at 223-25 (concluding that transaction lacked
economic substance or business purpose); IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, 2001-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶
50,470, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22610 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (finding a sham transaction because of the lack of
any change in the taxpayer’s economic position), rev’d by 253 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 2001).
218
See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 784-87 (5th Cir. 2001) (eliminating foreign tax
expense from profit calculation and using resulting pre-tax profit as evidence of economic substance and
business purpose), rev’g 113 T.C. 214 (1999); IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 354-56
(8th Cir. 2001) (reaching similar result), rev’g 2001-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ¶ 50,470, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22610 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
219
See United Parcel Serv. of Am. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018-20 (emphasizing participation of
unrelated firm and comparing UPS transaction to form-of-entity or debt-versus-equity tax-influenced
business decisions) (11th Cir. 2001), rev’g 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262 (1999).
220
See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at 180 (noting that “courts continue to struggle with
whether a transaction needs to possess both a bona fide non-tax business purpose and a reasonable
expectation of pre-tax profit to be sustained). See also Joseph Bankman, “The Economic Substance
Doctrine,” 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 5, 29 (2000) (noting the complexity and uncertainty of the economic
substance doctrine).
221
See, e.g. H.R. 4297, ___ Cong. ___ Sess., at §§ 411-13 (“clarifying” economic substance and providing
penalties for transactions without it) (passed by the Senate Feb. 2, 2006). See also Lee Sheppard, “News
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criticize this approach, arguing that the limits of statutory drafting would result in an
inferior doctrine.222 The government also no longer advocates economic substance
codification.223 Treasury and the IRS have concentrated their regulatory energies instead
on articulating, enforcing, and using information from a tax shelter “web of
disclosure.”224
2. Defining Tax Shelters: The Academic Debate
In parallel with its litigation efforts, Treasury and the IRS embarked in 2000 on a
regulatory assault on tax shelters that ultimately attempted to clearly identify
unacceptable tax shelters and prevent taxpayers from engaging in them. The effort to
define tax shelters reveals the complex schizophrenia of U.S. federal income tax law,
under which some provisions of law are nicely consistent with the theory of a realizationbased income tax and others are unabashed tax expenditures. Even if one can say that the
tax shelter rules aim at taxpayers who take wacky positions under rules grounded (or
which the government believes are grounded) in sensible income tax policy, it is often
hard to tell which group a rule belongs to.
Some commentators contend that a tax shelter definition should diligently avoid
encompassing transactions that have any business element.225 Another description
focuses on the objective economic substance of a transaction and considers transactions
illegitimate if economic losses (or gains) do not accompany tax losses (or gains) of
similar magnitude.226 Some commentators focus on legislative intent, rather than
business or tax motive;227 others would simply err on the side of overinclusiveness.228
Another approach is to list the common features of tax shelters. This method
borrows from the tax motivated, economic substance and legislative intent concepts while
Analysis: Economic Substance Update,” 110 Tax Notes 1137 (Mar. 13, 2006) (noting that the provision,
scored as a $15 million revenue raiser, was expected to be deleted in conference).
222
See, e.g., Eustice, supra note 205, at 164-65 (stating that the economic substance doctrine is better left
to the courts); Bernard Wolfman, “Why Economic Substance is Better Left Uncodified,” 104 Tax Notes
445 (July 26, 2004) (“There is no shortcut.”). See also Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, 105
Colum. L. Rev. 1939, 1952-53 (2005) (arguing for disallowance of loss in excess of measurable net worth
decrease but not for codification of the economic substance doctrine).
223
See, e.g., “Senators Scrutinize ‘Peddlers’ of Abusive Tax Shelters,” 2003 TNT 204-1 (Oct. 22, 2003)
(noting administration’s opposition to codification of economic substance because of increased uncertainty
and burdens on IRS rulemaking process) (reporting comments of Pamela Olson, assistant secretary for tax
policy, at hearing before Senate Finance Committee).
224
See “Treasury Official Discusses Reportable Transactions, Disclosure Requirements, 2003 TNT 215-5
(Nov. 5, 2003) (noting comments of Eric Solomon describing a tax shelter policy based on a “web of
disclosure”).
225
See, e.g., David P. Hariton, “Commentary: Response to ‘Old ‘Brine’ in New Bottles’ (New Brine in
Old Bottles),” 55 Tax L. Rev. 397, 400 (2002) (proposing a narrow definition of a tax shelter a transaction
that “would not have been entered into at all but for the desire to claim tax benefits”).
226
See Eustice, supra note 205, at 155-56 (describing engineered Cottage Savings swap transaction as
legitimate because the accelerated loss was a real economic loss).
227
See Schler, supra note 6, 55 Tax L. Rev. at 331 (outlining definition).
228
See Pearlman, supra note 9, 55 Tax. L. Rev. at 290 (proposing a definition for purposes of disclosure of
a transaction “if there is any possibility that the action does not comply with current law”).
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bringing them down to a more practical level. Professor Bankman’s 1999 list included
items such as providing a tax loss with little risk of economic loss (an economic
substance concept); the presence of a tax-indifferent party (which suggests that the taxconcerned party will be able to fulfill its tax-motivated strategy without pushback); and
the presence of a flaw in the tax system that mismatches economic and tax income (a
factor relating to legislative intent).229 Professor Eustice proposes a similar list, adding
the absence of economic profit prospects or business purpose.230
Bankman and Eustice also include factors relating to the marketing or promotion
of tax shelters in their lists of characteristics, suggesting that “prepackaged”
transactions231 and transactions suitable for use by more than one taxpayer232 are more
likely to be tax shelters. These factors follow from the insight that tax strategies that
develop independently of a taxpayer’s particular business situation more likely lack
business purpose or economic substance. Bankman also lists the following factor: “the
shelter is likely to be shut down by legislative or administrative change soon after it is
detected.”233 The government acted definitively on this most pragmatic factor through its
disclosure regulations, discussed below. And, particularly with respect to listed
transactions, tax regulators gave great weight to promotion and marketing as a business
purpose proxy.
3. The Web of Disclosure
The government first proposed tax shelter regulations in response to the recent
wave or corporate tax shelter activity in February 2000.234 Its initial attempt featured a
broad definition of tax shelter transactions and (due to a lack of Congressional action)235
no penalties for nondisclosure. The regulations were not as effective as the government
had hoped.236 After several rounds of amendment, drafters arrived at a clearer and more
specific approach. The government also established the dedicated Office of Tax Shelter
Analysis to identify and shut down tax shelter transactions.
Today, taxpayer disclosure requirements and material advisor reporting and list
maintenance obligations target five categories of transactions: (1) listed transactions,
which are specific transactions described by the IRS in quick-and-dirty Notices designed
to shut down the transaction fast without elaborate regulatory process; (2) transactions
229

See Joseph Bankman, “The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters,” Tax Notes, June 21, 1999, at 1775,
_____ (paragraph [7]).
230
See Eustice, supra note 205, at 158-59.
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See Eustice, supra note 205, at 159.
232
See Bankman, supra note 229, at ___.
233
Bankman, supra note 229, at ___.
234
See T.D. 8877, __ Fed. Reg. __ (Feb. 28, 2000) (proposing corporate tax shelter disclosure regulations);
Announcement 2000-12, 2000-12 I.R.B. 1 (Feb. 29, 2000) (summarizing regulations).
235
Tax shelter disclosure and penalty provisions made it into a Senate Finance Committee discussion draft
in 2000, see Ryan J. Donmoyer & Heidi Glenn, “Finance Antishelter ‘Draft’ Boosts Penalties, Standards of
Conduct,” 1999 TNT 233-2 (Dec. 6, 1999), but did not appear in final legislation.
236
See Larry R. Langdon, “Langdon Testimony at Finance Committee Hearing on Tax Shelters,” 2002
TNT 56-20 (Mar. 22, 2002) (providing testimony of IRS official Langdon that promoters interpreted the
rules narrowly and inadequate disclosure resulted).
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with large tax losses; (3) confidential transactions; (4) transactions that contractually
require the return of an adviser’s fee if the desired tax outcome does not result; and (5)
transactions with brief asset holding periods.237 Under a 2004 statute, specific penalties
apply for nondisclosure.238 In addition, the government has established a policy of
requesting all audit workpapers from any taxpayer who has engaged in an undisclosed
listed transaction, echoing the Thompson memo’s emphasis on cooperation to remedy
misbehavior.239
The government’s practice of discovering abusive transactions through a focused
tax shelter office and labeling transactions tax shelters by “listing” them through
immediately-effective Notices is central to its disclosure strategy under these revised
regulations. Notices have identified about 30 transactions as shelters.240 For example,
Notice practice tarred each of the tax shelters described above in Part V.B.1 despite the
fact that courts are still considering the validity of some of them. Listed transactions are
typically marketed and promoted products, and the government’s focus on promotion as a
litmus test for abusive tax shelters is public information.241
The government’s strategy of specifically labeling promoted tax shelter
transactions as deviant behavior has apparently effectively translated into an anti-tax
237

See I.R.C. § 6111 (requiring material advisor reporting); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(b)(1) (requiring
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tax returns, which lays out book-tax differences for corporate tax returns in more detail. See Notice 20066, 2006-5 I.R.B. 385.
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supra note 103, 465 U.S. at 816-21 (requiring auditors to produce workpapers in response to IRS
summons). See also I.R.C. § 7525(b) (providing that communications relating to transactions with a
significant purpose of federal income tax avoidance or evasion do not enjoy the tax practitioner-client
statutory privilege) (crossreferencing I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)).
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See Notice 2004-67, 2004-41 I.R.B. 600 (providing 30 listed transactions posted as of October 12,
2004). The current list is posted on the IRS website at
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html.
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See GAO 2003 Report, supra note 200, at 4, 7 (stating that IRS uses promoter investigations to identify
shelters and uses investor information to identify promoters). See also “Unofficial Transcript Is Available
of Forum on Tax Shelters,” supra note 4 (“I think the key aspect of technical tax shelters is marketing.)
(quoting Eric Solomon).
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shelter compliance norm. Government officials say taxpayers have simply stopped
engaging in the development or use of such promoted tax shelter products.242 Perhaps
government officials say this without adequate evidence in order to enhance others’ view
of their performance or increase taxpayer compliance by conveying the impression that
most taxpayers comply.243 But this approach would conflict with IRS and Treasury
incentives to support additional budget requests.
In addition, other available information corroborates the government officials’
view. For example, former government officials agree with it.244 Practitioners
informally report that they do not currently observe the promoting and marketing of tax
shelter products to public corporations. And one firm, KPMG, has explicitly agreed not
to ever develop or market “prepackaged tax products” again and to have an internal
monitor verify its compliance with this (and other) requirements for at least three
years.245
Organizational behavior learning identifies ethical uncertainty as a factor that
causes large organization norms to veer toward aggressive behavior.246 This suggests
that the clarity of the tax shelter rules, particularly the listed transaction rules, has
contributed significantly to their success. Although numerous other factors affect a
regulator’s choice between rules and standards, this example suggests a reason to
consider rules very seriously where the regulated party is a large organization. Perhaps
the case is even stronger where, as in the tax shelter case, a relatively clear litmus test
(promotion) is available and the regime is a disclosure regime, not an automatic liability
regime.
C. New FASB Tax Benefit Accounting Standard
FASB’s revisions to the standard for recording tax benefits for financial
accounting purposes provide another example of the responsiveness of public corporation
tax decisionmaking groups to revised, stricter rules. Under the longstanding standard,
such benefits were denied for financial accounting purposes only if it was probable that
they would be successfully asserted by the government.247 Under a standard proposed in
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See supra note 4 (summarizing government officials’ view that tax shelters are no longer widely
promoted to large corporations). This view is corroborated by remarks of prior government officials now
in private practice.
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See, e.g., Interview of Carl Levin by Frontline, posted Feb. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/shelter/return.html (reporting interview with
Democratic Senator from Michigan) (“That’s obviously an opinion which anyone who defends the status
quo is going to give – that things have changed. I don’t buy it at all.”).
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See, e.g., Interview of Pamela Olson by Frontline, posted Feb. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/shelter/return.html (“[I] think that the firms are
sufficiently concerned about the reputational damage of being in this tax shelter business. There is much
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See KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 139, at 5, 19, 21-22.
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See supra Part II.E.
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See FAS 109, ¶¶ 8 and 17(e) (providing that tax assets are reduced by a valuation allowance if it is
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operating losses); FAS 5 (requiring the recording of loss contingencies (such as the possibility of increased
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July 2005, such liabilities would have been recorded unless it is probable that, assuming
they are asserted by the government, the government would lose.248 The proposal drew
significant criticism from commentators who noted that it might result in accounting
inaccuracies, in particular over-reporting of liabilities or under-reporting of assets.249
Commentators expected some softening and extension of the effective date of the
proposal.250 Nevertheless, the pending proposal caused some auditors to require a higher
level of assurance than before for the recording of a future tax benefit – i.e. a “should”
opinion rather than a “more likely than not” opinion – before it was finalized.251
FASB has since softened the standard to permit the recording of future tax
benefits if it is “more likely than not” that, assuming they are asserted by the government,
the government would lose.252 This standard, still tougher than the longstanding tax
benefit accounting standard, also has a clear effect in public corporation tax departments.
Tax director surveys show that such groups are devoting significant energy to compliance
with the new standard.253
V.

Norm Development and Tax Policy

This cultural story of the development of an anti-tax shelter norm raises several
broader points. First, it provides a framework to consider whether a broader compliance
norm, extending beyond promoted tax shelters, might develop. Second, it provokes the
question of how either a narrow anti-tax shelter norm or a broader compliance norm
could achieve permanence. Third, it raises the issue of regulatory cost-benefit analysis.

taxes on audit) if it is “probable” that the liability exists). See also James R. Browne, “Financial Reporting
for Uncertain Tax Positions,” 109 Tax Notes 77, TAN 7-33 (Oct. 3, 2005) (explaining current standards).
248
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of FASB Statement No. 109 (July 14, 2005); Browne, supra note 247, at TAN 34-38 (explaining proposed
standard).
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See, e.g., Browne, supra note 247, TAN 57-59 (stating that longstanding standard more accurately
reports tax assets and liabilities).
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See “FASB to Delay Implementation of Uncertain Tax Position Guidance Until 2006, Says SEC
Official,” 2005 TNT 214-2 (Nov. 4, 2005) (reporting comments of Brian Bullard that FASB planned to
relax proposed standard and postpone its implementation). The original effective date of the last quarter of
2005 was eventually pushed back a year to the first year beginning after December 15, 2006. See Sirena J.
Scales, “FASB Agrees on New Effective Date for Guidance on Uncertain Tax Positions,” 2006 TNT 8-2
(Jan. 12, 2006). At least some tax directors expected the pushback. See id.
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See, e.g., Ken Gee & Rob Terpening, Presentation at San Jose State University/Tax Executives Institute
High Technology Tax Institute, in Palo Alto, CA (Nov. 8, 2005) (commenting that different auditors have
different standards and that some have tightened their standard as a result of the proposed changes to FAS
109). See also KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 139, at 7 (accepting a heightened
opinion standard). One survey also reports that financial statement disclosure relating to uncertain tax
positions has increased. See TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1 at 18 (reporting that 63% of respondents
report such disclosure has increased in the past two years).
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See FASB Interpretation No. 48 at 12 (June 2006), available at http://www.fasb.org.pdf.fin%2048.pdf.
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See, e.g., TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1, at 37 (reporting that 41% of respondents cited FAS 109
compliance as the top tax group challenge).
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A. How to Promote a Broader Norm.
1. The Existing Narrow Norm.
The new tax compliance norm described in this paper is narrow: the demise of
promoted tax shelters. The question of whether a broader conservatism has developed
remains open. Some developments, such as accounting firms’ adherence to the stricter
FASB rules in advance of their finalization or effective date,254 point to a broader
tendency to give more conservative advice. In addition, there are anecdotal reports of
somewhat more conservative planning behaviors apart from the avoidance of listed
transactions. For example, firms doing offshore tax planning may expect their Section
404 auditor and their financial auditor to push back at the margins, demanding larger
payments in exchange for the transfer of existing technology overseas, suggesting
adjustments to transfer prices so they are slightly less favorable to the corporation,
requiring completed paperwork documenting intercompany agreements and checking to
ensure that those written agreements are followed more carefully in practice.
But it goes too far to say that the tax shelter and Sarbanes-Oxley exercise has
generated a broader social norm of conservative corporate taxpaying behavior.255 One
major area of continued big-ticket tax planning shifts income to lower-tax offshore
locations.256 Another involves the use of hybrid securities treated as interest-generating
debt for tax purposes and equity for other regulatory purposes.257 Tax planners continue
to pursue patents for some tax-reduction ideas, a pattern that suggests some of the same
lack-of-business-purpose problems as tax shelter promotion.258 Tax decisionmakers may
rely on unclear IRS guidance to reach aggressive conclusions in these areas,259 while top
IRS officials identify them as current compliance challenges.260
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See infra Part IV.C.
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257
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__ (Feb. 8, 2006) (reporting issuances of hybrid instruments).
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See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 109th Cong., “Background and Issues Relating to the Patenting of
Tax Advice” 22-23 (Comm. Print. 2006) (noting that the patent process may encourage the development of
marketable products by providing protection against duplication of a patented structure without any
requirement of disclosure under the tax shelter regulations absent a contractual requirement of
confidentiality).
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162-1, Part A (describing the proposed “investor model” concept for arriving at arm’s length prices for
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2. The Carrot and the Stick
So how should the government build on the success of its campaign against
promoted tax shelters to increase taxpayer compliance in other areas? The direct
prescription, based on the case study discussed in this Article, might read as follows:
further expand the internal transparency and size of the tax decisionmaking group,
aggressively pursue enforcement programs that affect each member of the group, and
clearly label deviant transactions in non-tax shelter areas. That is what appears to have
worked for tax shelters; why shouldn’t it work for offshore planning and financing
transactions and other current areas of compliance concern?
IRS and Treasury leaders have spoken out regularly and thoughtfully on issues of
compliance and enforcement in recent years. They have notably not focused exclusively
on hard-nosed enforcement and scarlet-letter listing tactics. Instead, they emphasize
service as well as enforcement.261 According to the head of LMSB, the large-corporation
division of the IRS, the government’s goal is to reach out to good-faith taxpayers and
build efficient working relationships marked by trust and cooperation, while cracking
down insistently on bad-faith taxpayers.262 Academics such as Professor Dan Kahan
have also endorsed this idea of different regulatory approaches depending on the
cooperation offered by regulated parties.263
This Article’s story about the development of a narrow tax shelter compliance
norm is a story about a stick, not a carrot (with some nuance; for example, the tax shelter
settlement programs offered might fit the carrot mold). It clearly offers a useful model
intangibles transfers, which would attribute greater value to IP generated by US parent corporations
because it would attach value to those corporations’ “external contributions”). Rev. Rul. 2003-97, 2003-34
I.R.B. 380 (permitting separate treatment of debt and equity components of certain collateralized forward
contracts, resulting in an interest deduction for issuer). See also Lee Sheppard, “News Analysis: Is
Apportionment the Formula for Intangible Development?,”108 Tax Notes 1093 (Sept. 5, 2005) (criticizing
confusing state of existing and proposed transfer pricing regulations and recommending a formulary
apportionment approach); Lee Sheppard, “News Analysis: Having it Both Ways on Feline PRIDES,” 2005
TNT 25-4 (Feb. 3, 2005) (alleging that Rev. Rul. 2003-97 does not reconcile with I.R.C. Section 163(l),
which prohibits an interest deduction for interest payable in equity).
260
See, e.g., “Written Testimony of Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson Before Senate
Committee on Finance on Compliance Concerns Relative to Large and Mid-Size Businesses” at 5-8 (June
13, 2006) available at www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/061306testme.pdf (listing
intangibles transfers, cost sharing, and transfer pricing and abusive foreign tax credit, hybrid instrument or
entity transactions as major global compliance concerns).
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See, e.g., “IRS Commissioner Mark W. Everson Statement on 2005 Enforcement and Service Results,”
1005 TNT 213-10 (Nov. 3, 2005) (emphasizing goals of service, modernization and enforcement and
reporting enforcement results).
262
Telephone Interview with Deborah M. Nolan, Commissioner, IRS Large and Mid-Size Business
Division (June 23, 2006).
263
See Dan M. Kahan, “The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law,” 102 Mich. L. Rev.
71, 83-84 (2003) (suggesting that governments should encourage the reciprocal compliance behavior by
emphasizing other taxpayers’ compliance rather than the possibility of audit, but should also punish
“dedicated cheaters”). See also Tranter, Evasion in Taxation (1929); Braithwaite, ed., Taxing Democracy:
Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion (2003).
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for other situations in which the IRS wishes to clamp down on deviant transactions. In
particular, the story demonstrates the power of a group to reinforce compliance norms if
all members of the group have ample incentive to comply. This in turn suggests the
importance of enforcement on all fronts – with respect to tax directors, their superiors
within corporate organizations and their advisors, for example. And the story shows the
particular power of clear rules to promote compliance in a group norm situation.
One area where this approach may again prove effective is in the effort to stop tax
protesters, who claim constitutional rights and currently face several well-publicized
enforcement efforts. This is not a large organization issue, and some of the behavioral
patterns discussed in this Article may consequently be muted. Nevertheless, individuals
in society are also susceptible to the development of group norms, and the basic
framework should be applicable. In the tax protester situation, the government has
established a clear rule by summarily rejecting constitutional and other blanket arguments
supporting nonpayment of federal income taxes.264 It has also tried to pursue
enforcement actions against both advisers and taxpayers, which may have a
disproportionately strong effect on compliance by influencing more than one element of
an individual’s tax decisionmaking group.265
Other current compliance issues are more grey than black-and-white. Take costsharing and offshore intellectual property transfers. The typical plan in this case for a
U.S. parent company involves locating valuable intellectual property (or “IP”) in a lowtax offshore subsidiary and directing offshore profits to that IP holding company. One
piece of this strategy involves structuring intercompany payments among offshore
subsidiaries to avoid pitfalls in subpart F, which taxes a U.S. parent corporation on
certain passive or mobile income of its non-U.S. subsidiaries.266 The other piece, a more
prominent current compliance target, involves the placement of intellectual property in
the IP holding company.267 The U.S. parent taxpayer benefits if it can sell its existing IP
to the IP holding company at a low price and charge the IP holding company low future
“cost-sharing” payments for the non-US interest in future IP, because it will recognize
less gain or income and will still wholly control the IP.268
Recent proposed regulations attempt to address the problem of underpricing
intellectual property sent offshore by introducing the “investor model” concept to force
taxpayers to more fully recognize the value of the U.S. parent corporation’s contribution
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See Statement of Eileen J. O’Connor, supra note 127, at 16 (listing such “tax fraud” schemes).
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to the development of the IP when setting these prices.269 And recent enforcement efforts
have alleged that some firms have stepped over the line with respect to their intellectual
property valuations or cost-sharing methodology.270 Is the government attempting to
develop a hard-nosed approach that labels aggressive IP pricing for offshore transfers
deviant and bad, just as it labeled promoted tax shelters deviant and bad?
The government would be ill-advised to do so; its stakeholders do not show signs
of willingness to accept such a label of deviance. The offshore IP transfer situation is
grey factually, because it depends (under current law) on a facts-and-circumstances
valuation exercise. It is grey from a policy perspective, if one believes that U.S. parent
corporations may invest in non-U.S. subsidiaries. And enforcement efforts to tar certain
aggressive taxpayers have not produced government success. In particular, the Tax
Court271 and other nations’ tax authorities,272 seem to think the issues are grey.
3. Lessons for Grey Areas.
If the lessons of this Article’s tax shelter norm development story are relatively
clear for deviant transactions, like the tax protester case, they are more subtle for grey
areas, like offshore IP planning.
Consider first enforcement. As Professor Kahan points out, some empirical
evidence suggests that broad-based enforcement can lead taxpayers to believe that
noncompliance is widespread, thus encouraging them to cheat more.273 Enforcement, he
argues, is better aimed at determined tax cheats than at taxpayers prepared to make a
good effort at compliance.274 This view of enforcement suggests in grey areas, where it
believes that there are good taxpayers as well as bad taxpayers, the government should
separate good from bad, and adopt different strategies for each.
Next consider the value of clear rules. The success of clear regulations aimed at
tax shelter promoters is not always transferable, because many transactions are not
“clearly deviant” but rather fall into a grey area. The literature on the efficiency of rules
vs. standards demonstrates that clear rules are not always an appropriate solution, due to
factors such as possibly suffocating complexity275 and ease of avoidance.276
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See, e.g., Xilinx Inc. v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. 37, 52-53 (2005) (upholding that taxpayer’s omission of
stock option costs from allocated costs under its transfer pricing agreement); “Glaxo Sees Global Scrutiny
for Transfer Pricing of Popular Drugs,” BNA Daily Tax Report, at J-1 (Apr. 19, 2004) (noting U.S.
assertion that too little value was attributed to U.S. marketing intangibles and too much profit was
attributed to UK parent of GlaxoSmithKline). The Glaxo litigation is still underway.
271
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Commentators also persuasively argue that not all regulatory situations are
susceptible of rules. For example, some situations are too dependent on endlessly
varying facts and circumstances,277 or do not permit a rule that closes off close
substitutions to taxpayer planning.278 These problems may be somewhat muted in the
case of tax shelter regulation, because its status as a disclosure regime may mean that
overinclusiveness does not carry any direct liability for appropriate transactions.279
Clear rules’ ability to relatively smoothly translate into organizational norms
constitutes a factor in favor of rules instead of standards in the large corporation context.
But there remain many areas where standards, not rules, are the right approach. In these
cases, the recognition that standards’ vagueness presents a challenge for the development
of a large organization compliance norm should prompt the government to call in
different strategies to help organizations draw responsible lines.
Finally, consider the expanded and more transparent tax decisionmaking group at
public corporations. If a more cooperative, non-enforcement strategy is appropriate for
good-faith taxpayers, and if some situations require standards-based regulation under
which organizations must draw lines, how should the government think about the
instrumental large-corporation tax decisionmaking group? The smart regulatory route
would harness the potential strength of the group in some way, just as the multifaceted
enforcement and clear rule combination harnessed its strength and amplified the
compliance tendencies of its members in the case of promoted tax shelters.
Some proposals to encourage compliance in areas beyond the marketed tax shelter
arena rely on gatekeeper policing and try to increase the visibility and reputational costs
of bad advice. For example, Professor Linda Beale has recently made just such a
proposal to improve tax practitioners’ compliance ethic. She suggests raising the
standard for a return filing position to more-likely-than-not and removing attorney-client
privilege protection for pre-filing advice.280
Tax regulators have pursued some efforts to improve gatekeeper ethics, most
notably the amendments to Circular 230.281 But they have also more directly tried to
influence large corporations’ tax decisionmaking process. Several recent initiatives rely
on more, and earlier, direct communication between the government and the tax
decisionmakers at large corporations. The programs try to select good-faith corporate
taxpayers and put a government representative in direct communication with tax
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decisionmakers at the tax decisionmaking stage.282 The issues subject to resolution
include grey areas such as the offshore IP transfer example discussed above.
The flagship “real time audit”283 or “CAP” program targets certain large
corporations284 and involves an agreement executed by the government and the taxpayer,
which identifies the goals of the CAP relationship.285 In almost all cases, top
management signs off on the IRS presence.286 In its pilot year, 17 large corporations
accepted IRS invitations to participate in CAP.287 The CAP program anticipates
“extensive cooperation between the Service and participating taxpayers;”288 its goal is to
resolve all material issues before the filing of a return, in which case the IRS pledges that
it will not audit the return filed in accordance with the agreement.289
The CAP early issue resolution program is a conscious government effort to take
advantage of the compliance-oriented environment that currently prevails inside public
corporations, including expanded and more transparent tax decisionmaking groups.290 It
is consistent with an organizational behavior insight: a tax group that invites the IRS to
participate in its decisionmaking is more likely to develop and sustain strong tax
compliance norms. This creative approach has achieved preliminary success291 and
deserves continued support.
The CAP program and similar initiatives differ radically in tone and approach
from the disclose-and-settle-or-we’ll-get-you tax shelter regulatory approach. CAP’s
approach is a carrot. The head of LMSB describes it as a mutually beneficial trade of
transparency for certainty within the context of a cooperative regulatory relationship.292
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The tax shelter approach is a stick. Government commenters express their anger at
participants in tax shelters and their determination to exact penalties.293
Despite this difference, the tax shelter story and the CAP story belong in the same
organizational behavior book. In the tax shelter case, the existence of a larger, more
transparent tax decisionmaking group amplified the consistent, clear message of the tax
shelter regulations and contemporaneous tax and securities enforcement efforts, such that
all those involved focused on compliance, at least in the tax shelter area. The CAP
program more explicitly targets this decisionmaking group by seeking to get the IRS
invited to its table, before the tax return is filed. But both approaches leverage the larger
and more transparent post-Sarbanes-Oxley tax decisionmaking group. While the tax
shelter example provides a regulatory model, in tax and other areas, for deviant
transactions susceptible to rules and deviant taxpayers responsive to enforcement, the
CAP example provides a regulatory model for grey-area transactions susceptible to
standards and good-faith taxpayers responsive to cooperative regulatory efforts.
B. How to Address Norm Cyclicality.
1. A Permanent Anti-Tax Shelter Norm?
On the evidence we now have, there is little reason to expect a permanent current
uptick in corporate tax compliance, even with respect to the relatively narrow issue of tax
shelters. Commentators have previously observed a historical cycle of fraud, crackdown,
compliance, a shift of focus from enforcement to service, and then more fraud.294 The
observed recent increase in compliance with respect to tax shelters may simply represent
the “crackdown” portion of the cycle.295 In addition, the listed transaction rules will no
longer deter tax shelter participation if they fail to seek out and list new promoted
transactions. Enforcement and rule currency are two important elements of maintaining
the current tax shelter compliance norm.
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Part III of this Article attributes the increased interest in compliance to top
executives’ and tax specialists’ fear of enforcement action. Without continued reminders
of the government’s view and determination to enforce it, compliance programs that look
good on paper can falter as effective regulatory tools, as regulated parties respond to a
reduced economic incentive to comply, perceive that other taxpayers may not comply,
and interpret uncertain areas of the law to further their own self-interest.296 The
government appears to be well aware of this risk. Treasury and the IRS, together with
federal prosecutors, have clearly prioritized enforcement.297 They must continue to do
so.
Of course, the government cannot control the success of its enforcement program.
It faces considerable litigation hazards. The use of the Thompson memo to turn
employers against employees, the criminal fraud and conspiracy theory of the KPMG tax
shelter case, and the alleged invalidity of various tax products may not stand up in court.
The perceived violation of KPMG personnel’s constitutional rights in connection with the
pending criminal case,298 for example, could generate an anti-government outcry similar
to the perception of unethical IRS behavior that prompted the 1998 Act. In addition,
continued enforcement efforts aimed at senior corporate executives often fall outside the
tax context and beyond the jurisdiction of Treasury, the IRS, or the Tax Division of the
Justice Department.
With respect to rule currency, IRS and Treasury should treat the tax shelter
regulations as a living document. The Office of Tax Shelter Analysis provides a good
institutional forum to filter suggestions for additional listed transactions. In addition, the
government’s attention to new regulatory strategies such as the possible listing of “yellow
light” transactions,299 its conscious keeping of lists of areas of compliance concern,300 its
consideration of issues such as the proper treatment of patented transactions301 and its
apparently close examination of the new, more detailed schedules M-3 showing corporate
book and tax differences302 all indicate that the government devotes considerable energy
to keeping these rules current.
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Enforcement strength and rule currency feed into the tax decisionmaking groups
to foster a tax shelter compliance norm. Without them, the current norm may be
expected to falter. The dependence of the current norm on continued enforcement and
rule clarity follows in part from the deviant nature of the transactions targeted. There is
no assumption, in other words, that the targets of tax shelter regulation have internalized
a lasting social norm of compliance.
2. Making a Broader Tax Compliance Norm Permanent.
Part V.A.3 above suggests that broadening a tax compliance norm into grey areas
will benefit from a cooperative approach, like the IRS takes in its early-issue-resolution
initiatives such as CAP. Such initiatives attempt to use cooperative and frank discussion,
not enforcement and clear rules, to encourage compliance. They assume a population of
good-faith taxpayers, not deviant tax avoiders.
The above discussion in Part V.B.1 argued that the continuation of a tax shelter
compliance norm depended on continued enforcement and rule clarity for effective
policing of deviant taxpayers. What determines whether a compliance norm emerging
from CAP and similar programs will survive?
As with the tax shelter regulations, the cooperative initiatives will continue to
have effect only if their elements are maintained. These initiatives, however, use
different tools than the tax shelter regulations. In addition to relying on enforcement of
penalties against deviant taxpayers, as in the shelter area, they depend on the
development of a responsible and responsive relationship between IRS personnel and the
taxpayer. IRS personnel must do their part to build and maintain such good-government
relationships.
In addition, perhaps CAP has the capacity to foster a stronger tax compliance
norm internalized into the large corporation’s de facto ethical code, as well as a stronger
cooperation norm from the government’s point of view.303 Such internalized social
norms might not withstand an extended or egregious breach of trust, but they could help
sustain a compliance pattern through lesser difficulties. Cliff Jernigan, a seasoned tax
director and tax practitioner who served as a senior member of the LMSB IRS team when
CAP was adopted, writes:
I predict that CAP will become the favored filing process by large
companies. Quality taxpayers will want to tell others in their industry that
they are viewed as good taxpayers by using the CAP process. Company
CEOs will want their companies in the CAP program because it, like the
Malcolm Baldridge Quality Award, will signify a quality company known
for its honesty and fair dealing.304
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Perhaps CAP participation will come to provide a clear and visible signal of
honesty, encouraging others (such as prospective business partners and employees) to
deal with CAP corporations.305 Perhaps such positive feedback will foster the
internalization of a corporation tax compliance norm, under which individuals within a
corporation feel pride in tax compliance and guilt as a result of noncompliance.306
Theories relating to development of internalized social norms within organizations tie
into individual psychology307 as well as large-organization behavioral theory308 and a full
examination of them is beyond the scope of this Article. Here, it means simply to suggest
that the CAP program may open the door to the development of a tax compliance norm
that is inherently stronger and more lasting than the current narrow tax shelter
compliance norm. Time will tell if it succeeds.
C. Is the Norm Worth the Cost?
A complete cost-benefit analysis of the observed tax compliance norm is beyond
the scope of this Article.309 Nevertheless, this section offers several preliminary
observations and attempts to suggest the complexity of the exercise.
There are at least seven significant elements: the benefit of additional tax
revenues; the benefit of deterring other undesirable transactions that taxpayers declined to
enter into due to concern about adverse tax outcomes; the cost of deterring valid tax
planning; the cost of deterring frank attorney-client consultation as a result of the erosion
of the attorney-client privilege; the cost of additional monitoring under Sarbanes-Oxley,
including external Section 404 audits and independent board committees; the cost of tax
and securities enforcement; and the cost of researching and drafting new rules. The CAP
program and similar initiatives involve additional commitments of government resources,
including significant IRS personnel time.
Each of these elements presents its own estimation challenges. For example, the
payment of taxes to the government represents not an increase in economic activity, but
305
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rather a transfer that hopefully promotes a more efficient and equitable tax system.310
Enforcement has the capacity to emphasize that deviant taxpayers, while unusual, are
firmly dealt with (which would be expected to increase other taxpayers’ compliance) or
to suggest that noncompliance is widespread (which would be expected to decrease other
taxpayers’ compliance).311 Commentators also debate the importance of “good” tax
planning, differing on the key question of the extent to which such planning guides
taxpayers away from traps in the law that would result in taxpayer-adverse results
contrary to legislative intent.312
Measuring the cost of Sarbanes-Oxley, rulemaking and enforcement is a daunting
and inexact task. Moreover, only a portion of the Sarbanes-Oxley and enforcement costs
should be attributed to tax compliance efforts. It is also possible that a less expensive
form of, for example, Section 404 could support an equally effective expanded and
transparent tax decisionmaking group. Next, some evidence challenges the traditional
assumption that erosion of the attorney-client privilege deters frank attorney-client
conversations.313 Finally, the net cost of the CAP program and similar programs is likely
to be known only after it has run for a number of years, since the benefit of avoiding later
tax audit-related costs will offset the initial investment in the program.
Conclusion
Regulators of large corporations and other organizations can profitably use the
organizational behavior insights offered by this Article. The Article observes three
factors that contribute to a currently observed anti-tax shelter compliance norm at large
corporations: an expanded and more transparent decisionmaking group, enforcement and
publicity efforts directed at every member of that group, and clear rules. These three
factors provide a blueprint for the deterrence of clearly deviant transactions.
Less obviously, the tax shelter story offers the more general lesson that attention
to of the behavioral dynamics of decisionmaking groups can strengthen regulatory
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efforts. In grey areas, where regulated parties may be acting in good faith and/or where
broad regulatory standards, rather than clear rules, are appropriate, behaviorally sensitive
regulation may involve government efforts to directly participate in such decisionmaking
groups, as with the IRS CAP program. The experience of these two different approaches
to influencing tax decisions within large corporations can inform and assist regulators in
nontax areas as well.
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